OWASP App Sec EU2006 WAFs When AreThey Useful

Web Application Firewalls:When Are They Useful?: 

Web Application Firewalls: When Are They Useful? Ivan Ristic Thinking Stone ivanr@webkreator.com +44 7766 508 210

Ivan Ristic: 

Ivan Ristic Web Application Security specialist; Developer. Author of Apache Security. Founder of Thinking Stone. Author of ModSecurity.

Why Use Web Application Firewalls?: 

Why Use Web Application Firewalls? In a nutshell: Web applications are deployed terribly insecure. Developers should, of course, continue to strive to build better/more secure software. But in the meantime, sysadmins must do something about it. (Or, as I like to say: We need all the help we can get.) Insecure applications aside, WAFs are an important building block in every HTTP network.

Network Firewalls Do Not Work For HTTP: 

Network Firewalls Do Not Work For HTTP Firewall Port 80 HTTP Traffic Web Client Web Server Application Application Database Server

WAFEC (1): 

WAFEC (1) Web Application Firewall Evaluation Criteria. Project of the Web Application Security Consortium (webappsec.org). It's an open project. Nine WAF vendors on board, but I'd like to see more users on the list. WAFEC v1.0 published in January. We are about to start work on v1.1.

WAFEC (2): 

WAFEC (2) Nine sections: Deployment Architecture HTTP and HTML Support Detection Techniques Prevention Techniques Logging Reporting Management Performance XML

WAFEC (3): 

WAFEC (3) WAFEC is not for the vendors. It's for the users. (So please voice your opinions!) http://www.webappsec.org/projects/wafec/

WAF Identity Problem (1): 

WAF Identity Problem (1) There is a long-standing WAF identity problem. With the name, first of all: Web Adaptive Firewall Web Application Firewall Web Application Security Device Web Application Proxy Web Application Shield Web Shield Web Security Firewall Web Security Gateway Web Security Proxy Web Intrusion Detection System Web Intrusion Prevention System Adaptive Firewall Adaptive Proxy Adaptive Gateway Application Firewall Application-level Firewall Application-layer Firewall Application-level Security Gateway Application Level Gateway Application Security Device Application Security Gateway Stateful Multilayer Inspection Firewall

WAF Identity Problem (2): 

WAF Identity Problem (2) There are four aspects to consider: Audit device Access control device Layer 7 router/switch Web Application Hardening tool These are all valid requirements but the name Web Application Firewall is not suitable. On the lower network layers we have a different name for each function.

WAF Identity Problem (3): 

WAF Identity Problem (3) Appliance-oriented web application firewalls clash with the Application Assurance market. Problems solved long time ago: Load balancing Clustering SSL termination and acceleration Caching and transparent compression URL rewriting …and so on

WAF Identity Problem (4): 

WAF Identity Problem (4) Key factors: Application Assurance vendors are very strong. Web Application Firewall vendors not as much. Result: Appliance-oriented WAFs are being assimilated by the Application Assurance market. In the meantime: Embedded WAFs are left alone because they are not an all-or-nothing proposition.

Slide12: 

WAF Functionality Overview

The Essentials (1): 

The Essentials (1) Full support for HTTP: Access to individual fields (field content, length, field count, etc). Entire transaction (both request and response). Uploaded files. Anti-evasion features (also known as normalisation/canonicalisation/transformation features).

The Essentials (2): 

The Essentials (2) Blocking features: Transaction Connection IP Address Session User Honeypot redirection TCP/IP resets (connection) Blocking via external device What happens upon detection?

Fancy Features: 

Fancy Features Stateful operation: IP Address data Session data User data Event Correlation High availability: Failover Load-balancing Clustering State replication

Hard-Coded Protection Techniques (1): 

Hard-Coded Protection Techniques (1) Cookie protection Sign/encrypt/virtualise Hidden field protection Sign/encrypt/virtualise Session management protection Enforce session duration timeout, inactivity timeout. Prevent fixation. Virtualise session management. Prevent hijacking or at least warn about it.

Hard-Coded Protection Techniques (2): 

Hard-Coded Protection Techniques (2) Brute-force protection Link validation Signing Virtualisation Request flow enforcement Statically Dynamically

Other Things To Consider (1): 

Other Things To Consider (1) Management: Is it possible to manage multiple sensors from one place? Support for administrative accounts with different privileges (both horisontal and vertical). Reporting (giving Management what it wants): On-demand and scheduled reports with support for customisation XML: WAFs are expected to provide basic support for XML parsing and validation. Full XML support is usually available as an option, or as a completely separate product.

Other Things To Consider (2): 

Other Things To Consider (2) Extensibility: Is it possible to add custom functionality to the firewall? Is the source code available? (But not as a replacement for a proper API.) Performance: New connections per second. Maximum concurrent connections. Transactions per second. Throughput. Latency.

Slide20: 

Signatures and Rules

Signatures or Rules?: 

Signatures or Rules? Signatures Simple text strings or regular expression patterns matched against input data. Not very flexible. Rules Flexible. Multiple operators. Rule groups. Anti-evasion functions. Logical expressions. Custom variables.

Three Protection Strategies: 

Three Protection Strategies External patching Also known as 'just-in-time patching' or 'virtual patching'). Negative security model Looking for bad stuff. Typically used for Web Intrusion Detection. Easy to start with but difficult to get right. Positive security model Verifying input is correct. Usually automated, but very difficult to get right with applications that change. It's very good but you need to set your expectations accordingly.

Slide23: 

Auditing and HTTP Traffic Monitoring

Web Intrusion Detection: 

Web Intrusion Detection Often forgotten because of marketing pressures: Detection is so last year (decade). Prevention sounds and sells much better! The problem with prevention is that it is bound to fail given sufficiently determined attacker. Monitoring (logging and detection) is actually more important as it allows you to independently audit traffic, and go back in time.

Monitoring Requirements: 

Monitoring Requirements Centralisation. Transaction data storage. Control over which transactions are logged and which parts of each transaction are logged, dynamically on the per-transaction basis. Minimal information (session data). Partial transaction data. Full transaction data. Support for data sanitisation. Can implement your retention policy.

Slide26: 

Deployment

Deployment: 

Deployment Three choices when it comes to deployment: Network-level device. Reverse proxy. Embedded in web server.

Deployment (2): 

Deployment (2) 1. Network-level device Does not require network re-configuration.

Deployment (3): 

Deployment (3) 2. Reverse proxy Typically requires network re-configuration.

Deployment (4): 

Deployment (4) 3. Embedded Does not require network re-configuration.

Deployment (5): 

Deployment (5) 1. Network passive Does not affect performance. Easy to add. Not a bottleneck or a point of failure. Limited prevention options. Must have copies of SSL keys. 2. Network in-line A potential bottleneck. Point of failure. Must have copies of SSL keys. Easy to add.

Deployment (6): 

Deployment (6) 3. Reverse proxy A potential bottleneck. Point of failure. Requires changes to network (unless it's a transparent reverse proxy). Must terminate SSL (can be a problem if application needs to access client certificate data). It's a separate architecture/security layer. 4. Embedded Easy to add (and usually much cheaper). Not a point of failure. Uses web server resources.

Reverse Proxy As a Building Block: 

Reverse Proxy As a Building Block Reverse proxy patterns: Front door Integration reverse proxy Protection reverse proxy Performance reverse proxy Scalability reverse proxy Logical patterns, orthogonal to each other. Often deployed as a single physical reverse proxy.

Front Door (1/5): 

Front Door (1/5) Make all HTTP traffic go through the proxy Centralisation makes access control, logging, and monitoring easier

Integration Reverse Proxy (2/5): 

Integration Reverse Proxy (2/5) Combine multiple web servers into one Hide the internals Decouple interface from implementation

Protection Reverse Proxy (3/5): 

Protection Reverse Proxy (3/5) Observes traffic in and out Blocks invalid requests and attacks Prevents information disclosure

Performance Reverse Proxy (4/5): 

Performance Reverse Proxy (4/5) Transparent caching Transparent response compression SSL termination

Scalability Reverse Proxy (5/5): 

Scalability Reverse Proxy (5/5) Load balancing Fault tolerance Clustering

Slide39: 

Open Source Approach: Apache + ModSecurity

Apache: 

Apache One of the most used open source products. Available on many platforms. Free, fast, stable and reliable. Expertise widely available. Apache 2.2.x (finally!) released with many improvements: Improved authentication. Improved support for caching. Significant improvements to the mod_proxy code (and load balancing support). Ideal reverse proxy.

ModSecurity: 

ModSecurity Adds WAF functionality to Apache. In the 4th year of development. Free, open source, commercially supported. Implements most WAF features (and the remaining ones are coming soon). Popular and very widely used. Fast, reliable and predictable.

Apache + ModSecurity: 

Apache + ModSecurity Deploy as reverse proxy: Pick a nice server (I am quite fond of Sun's hardware offerings myself). Install Apache 2.2.x. Add ModSecurity. Add SSL acceleration card (optional). Or simply run ModSecurity in embedded mode.

ModSecurity: 

ModSecurity Strong areas: Auditing/logging support. Real-time traffic monitoring. Just-in-time patching. Prevention. Very configurable/programmable. Weak areas: No automation of the positive security model approach yet.

Slide44: 

Thank you! Download this presentation from http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ AppSec_Europe_2006 Questions?