Kentucky Prepares: Kentucky Prepares Pandemic Influenza Planning January 20, 2006 William D. Hacker, M.D., F.A.A.P., C.P.E. Commissioner Department for Public Health


Integrating Levels of Response Plans: Integrating Levels of Response Plans International: WHO Pandemic Influenza Plan National: HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan (11/05) State: Kentucky’s Pandemic Influenza Plan (since 2003 and updated regularly) Local: local health departments, communities, and HRSA planning regions Individual: citizens’ and families’ plans


All-Hazards Approach to Planning in KY: All-Hazards Approach to Planning in KY Pandemic plans are a subset of State/Local Public Health’s Disaster Response and Recovery Plan Flexible, yet comprehensive plans Plans must be exercised and updated, not left on a shelf Pandemic planning is the “ultimate plan”: if prepared for a pandemic, we can respond to any communicable disease threat


Planning Assumptions: Planning Assumptions Pandemic is NOT preventable Universal susceptibility to novel virus Pandemic outbreak will last 6 - 8 weeks Multiple (2 – 3) pandemic waves are likely Clinical disease attack rate up to 30%children (40%); adults (20%)


Planning Assumptions: Half of those ill seek outpatient medical care Hospitalization/death rates up to 10-fold variation depending upon virulence of virus Demand for services will exceed supply, non-traditional interventions may be required Planning Assumptions


Possible Impact of Pandemic in KY*: Possible Impact of Pandemic in KY* Health Deaths: 3000 – 7000 Hospitalizations: 9,200 – 21,400 Outpatient visits: 455,000 – 1.06 million Economic Infrastructure: Thousands at home either ill or caring for the ill Agricultural: if pandemic strain is avian flu *Model assumes attack rates of 15-35 % and is based on the 1968 pandemic, and a US population of 290 million persons. Meltzer M, et al. Emerging Infectious Diseases 1999;5:659-671.


Key Components of Pandemic Planning: Key Components of Pandemic Planning Surveillance systems Quarantine / isolation procedures Public health personnel (staff + training) Medical surge capacity (staff + equipment) Predetermined Priority Groups as antivirals drugs and/or vaccine becomes available Distribution systems (e.g. Strategic National Stockpile) Government / Business contingency plans


Pandemic Planning Committee: Pandemic Planning Committee From CHFS (28): Director of Div. of Epi. Preparedness Branch (9) Communicable Dis. Br. (5) Immunization Br. (3) Lab (3) CDC Epidemiologist DPH Veterinarian Vital Statistics (2) Local Health Operations Public Health Protection and Safety Div. of Communications Other agencies (14 ): Local Health Dept. (3) KyEM (2) KOHS UK UL Lexington MMRS Louisville MMRS Northern KY MMRS US Army (Fort Campbell) Justice Cabinet State Representative


DPH Flu Surveillance Activities: DPH Flu Surveillance Activities Kentucky state statutes require reporting of communicable diseases to DPH Reports are analyzed by regional epidemiologists and by local “Epidemiology Rapid Response Team” members Participation in the “122 Cities Influenza and Pneumonia Mortality System” Participation during flu season in the “State and Territorial Epidemiologists Report”


DPH Flu Surveillance Activities: DPH Flu Surveillance Activities Each week, 11 Kentucky “Sentinel physicians” and 20 local sentinel health departments report influenza-like illnesses to DPH and we report to CDC DPH Lab is one of 75 “WHO Collaborating Laboratory Surveillance” facilities


Kentucky’s Strengths: Kentucky’s Strengths Long tradition of collaboration across a tightly knit state: state/local and public /private health “Pop Quizzes” test our response plans: West Nile virus, anthrax threats, SARS, tornados, chemical spills, Katrina, etc… Innovations in Public Health Information technology: telehealth, Health Alert Network, and e-Health Board Strategic National Stockpile plan (CDC telecast 4/05)


Collaborative Planning Partners: Collaborative Planning Partners State and Local Public Health Private Healthcare professionals (hospitals, physicians, pharmacist, EMS, etc.) Kentucky Emergency Management (state/local) Kentucky Department of Agriculture Kentucky Office of Homeland Security Kentucky Law Enforcement (Justice Cabinet) Government Officials ( state/local) Kentucky National Guard (41st Civil Support Team)


Bioterrorism Advisory Committee : Office of Rural Health KY Community Crisis Response Board Dept. for Local Government Office of Aging KY Labor Cabinet Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet Kentucky Fire Commission VA and Fort Knox MMRS Regions HRSA Advisory Committee Bioterrorism Advisory Committee State/Local Public Health Hospitals Physicians Academic Medical Centers KY EMS Kentucky Veterinary Medical Association Dept. of Agriculture KyEM KY Office of Homeland Security American Red Cross Primary Care Association


HRSA Regions: HRSA Regions Wayne Clinton Mercer Henry Kenton Campbell Gallatin Carroll Bracken Grant Oldham Harrison Boone Montgomery Pendleton Scott Bourbon Nicholas Franklin Fayette Clark Jefferson Robert son Mason Fleming Lewis Greenup Johnson Martin Breathitt Pike Powell Magoffin Floyd Wolfe Lee Owsley Leslie Perry Knott Letcher Clay Jackson Rockcastle Estill Laurel Madison Garrard Harlan Bell Knox Whitley Pulaski Lincoln Marion Larue Monroe Russell Casey Boyle McCreary Allen Hardin Breckinridge Grayson Todd Hopkins Marshall Meade Bullitt Washington Muhlenberg Graves Christian Crittenden Livingston Lyon Trigg Caldwell Daviess Henderson Hart Barren Simpson Logan Butler Warren Edmonson Metcalfe Cumberland Adair Lawrence Anderson Jessamine Owen Area 1 Area 2 Area 4 Area 3 Area 5 Area 6 Area 7 Area 8 Area 9 Area 10 Area 11 Area 12 Area 13 Area 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 13 9 10 12 14 11


Challenges: Challenges Some decisions cannot be made until the science (epidemiology) of the actual pandemic unfolds Unknown if antiviral drugs will be effective Likely limited availability of effective vaccine early in pandemic; priority groups a necessity Surge capacity limited; must depend on routine public health interventions, for example…


Challenges: “Social Distancing” sheltering at home - a “snow day” concept, telecommuting to work/school Successful response requires plans that work--- plans must be tested and updated regularly Challenges


Lessons Learned from Recent Events: Lessons Learned from Recent Events Public may not prepare even if repeatedly warned Real disasters may be worse than expected Outside help may be delayed in coming Concerns over health and safety of their family will affect responders Communications and logistics are critical success factors Impact may be both medical and economic


How every Kentuckian can prepare. . .: How every Kentuckian can prepare. . . Develop an “all hazards” emergency preparedness family plan Get a flu shot each fall Wash hands frequently Cough / sneeze into tissue or elbows Avoid crowds during outbreaks If sick stay home from work / school Advice for both seasonal and pandemic influenza


A Pandemic Effect on Kentuckians: A Pandemic Effect on Kentuckians Goal: prevent illness and death, and preserve critical community infrastructures Mother Nature does not “aim”; all are at risk The public/private health care system can not protect us from a pandemic We must respect the potential impact a Pandemic poses to all parts of society Therefore all sectors must participate in planning, exercising, and responding


Closing Thoughts: Closing Thoughts A pandemic does not appear imminent at this time Do not panic, but do get prepared Another pandemic will occur, we just don’t know when A prepared community is stronger Next step: engage with your local health department to hold a community wide summit to address these issues