exp controls haggerty

Slide1: 

Defense Technology Security and Export Controls May 23, 2007 Alan E. Haggerty Deputy Undersecretary of Defense International Technology Security 2001 N. Beauregard St, Suite 210B Alexandria, VA 22311 (703) 681-4166 x127

Outline: 

Outline The Challenge Militarily Critical Technologies Critical National Assets Program DFAR Update DoD 5200.39 Update

The ChallengeFundamental Global Changes: 

The Challenge Fundamental Global Changes

Militarily Critical Technologies: 

Militarily Critical Technologies Objectives of the MCT Program To define, to the extent possible, in quantitative technical terms, how technologies contribute to or have the potential to threaten US national security To evaluate global state-of-the-art and trends that affect the ability of the US and cooperating countries to control proliferation To recommend strategies and guidelines to facilitate international cooperation without imposing unnecessary restraints on commerce “The Secretary of Defense shall bear primary responsibility for developing a list of militarily critical technologies…” The list “…shall be sufficiently specific to guide the determinations of any official exercising export licensing responsibilities under this Act.” – Export Administration Act of 1979 (extended by Executive Order)

MCTP Focus Areas: 

MCTP Focus Areas Ask “first principle” questions What is a militarily critical technology? How can it best be protected? Future outlook Higher walls around a smaller castles Risk-based approach Feeder to Critical National Assets (CNA) Program Pragmatic actions Urgent content update Issue policy/instruction on MCTL End-to-end usability update – wiki and search engine Longer-term content scrub

CNA Background: 

CNA Background National Security Counsel directed action, managed by NCIX, and executed by FBI DUSD(ITS) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the FBI to provide Defense Critical National Assets Others: Energy; Director of National Intelligence; HHS; Treasury; DHS Special Access Programs (SAPS) are not included in the current effort. Players include FBI, CIFA, DIA, CIA, Service counterintelligence organizations and Acquisition Executives.

DoD CNA Process: 

DoD CNA Process Round 1: 57 DoD CNA technologies identified Primary criteria of US world leader Selected from Militarily Critical Technologies List Validated by CIA and DIA Round 2: (underway) to identify CNAs embedded in Weapon Systems Process is designed to be transparent, dynamic and iterative Identify – Protect – Enforce

DFAR Update: 

DFAR Update Requires government and contractor to exercise due diligence in handling export controlled data Does not levy extra security controls on Foreign Nationals in either DoD or Contractor controlled facilities Does not enable Foreign Nationals to access Classified National Defense Information Requires Government to notify recipient when export controlled data is provided Requires recipient to notify government when effort results in data becoming export controlled Proper balance between national security and requirements of Industry and Academia

DoD 5200.39 Background: 

DoD 5200.39 Background DOD Instruction 5200.39 establishes technology protection as appropriate on Science and Technology and Critical Program Information HELP OPEN Closed Pure Science and Basic Research Presidential Directive: “You Can’t Classify Science” No Restrictions Extreme DoD Black/SAP Burn-While-Reading Heavily Restricted Center Area is the Problem Need to Establish Transition Criteria What’s a Federal Bureaucrat to do?

DoDI 5200.39: 

DoDI 5200.39 Seeks to establish responsibility for calling transition Judgment about control will happen when an application is identified Control or Not? Made by funding technical authority (not faceless OSD weenie) Technical judgment as well as security issues apply

Status: 

Status Coming this Fiscal Year… Controversial In chop for over 7 years Best compromise we can make