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Premium member Presentation Transcript Slide1: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats in the Port EnvironmentMaritime CBRNE A Local Response ___A National Priority: Maritime CBRNE A Local Response ___ A National Priority Realities Gaps Solutions Ashley P. Moore CBRNE-Doctrine, Policy, and Requirements Anteon-ConsultantRealities: Realities The United States is a Maritime Nation We rely upon and profit from global commerce with trillions of dollars Any disruption of these worldwide supply chains will instantly create billions of dollars in economic loss and create cascading effects world wide Over the past 4 yrs and against the back drop of risk, we are merely scratching at the service to implement solutions.Terrorist ThreatRealities and CapabilitiesA Quick look: Terrorist Threat Realities and Capabilities A Quick look Open Source Intelligence 2002 - 2005The IED or VBIED Scenario: The IED or VBIED Scenario Terror at sea: VLCC Limburg Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) On Oct. 7, 2002 suspected Qaeda members rammed a boatload of explosives into the French- owned supertanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen, setting the vessel afire, after it had taken on 400,000 barrels of crude oil at Saudi Arabia's main oil terminal. This attack was carried out by the same mastermind (Al-Nashiri) of the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. Three days later the missing employees oil soaked body washed ashore.al-Qaeda Chemical Attack Could have Killed 80,000: al-Qaeda Chemical Attack Could have Killed 80,000 Monday, 26 April 2004 Earlier that month a mega-chemical attack averted in Jordan. After having more time to take a look at the ordinance involved, Jordanian officials have upped the estimated death toll: An expert cited in the program said that the 20 tons of explosives would have caused "two explosions: a traditional one and a chemical in an area of two square kilometers (close to one square mile)". "The chemical explosion would lead to the emission of poisonous chemical gasses which would cause physical deformities and direct injuries to the lungs and eyesight. "Outside this circle, the human loss would amount to around 80,000 people dead and 160,000 injured," according to one of the experts. Still no word on exactly where 20 tons of explosive came from, but open intell points towards Syria. Cont: Al-Qaeda Suspects Sought to Disperse Chemicals With Explosives, Says Expert in Jordan Trial: Cont: Al-Qaeda Suspects Sought to Disperse Chemicals With Explosives, Says Expert in Jordan Trial Thirteen al-Qaeda suspects on trial in Jordan intended to disperse unidentified chemical agents using “highly sensitive” explosives, an expert witness testified yesterday (see GSN, May 12, 2005). “From experiments I conducted on the material and from defendants’ confessions, the plan was to cause a conventional explosion using explosives to disperse chemicals encircling the explosives,” said Maj. Maan Abu-Nuwar, an explosives expert from Jordan’s intelligence agency. The indictment alleged that al-Zarqawi sent more than $118,000 to Jordan in part to buy two vehicles to be driven into the country's General Intelligence Department by suicide bombers armed with explosives and chemicals, including ammonium, potassium nitrate, nitroglycerin and liquid oxygen. An experiment conducted by the prosecution “led to a strong explosion and a poison cloud which spread over an area of 500 meters,” according to prosecutors. The nine men in custody, along with Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi and three other fugitives, are accused of plotting what was intended to be al-Qaeda’s first chemical attack, according to Jordanian authorities (Jamal Halaby, Associated Press, May 30).POSSIBLE CHEMICAL ATTACK against US base in Spain “Averted” : POSSIBLE CHEMICAL ATTACK against US base in Spain “Averted” 3 May 2005, "A French al-Qaida cell was planning a chemical attack against a U.S. naval base in Spain, Spanish newspaper ABC reported Tuesday. According to the paper, the French cell was preparing to unleash an unspecified chemical agent on the southern base in Rota, Spain. Implicated in the plan was Algerian Said Arif, who fled to Syria after escaping a raid by French authorities in 2002. He was extradited back to France last year. ABC reported Arif was also affiliated with Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the notorious al-Qaida's leader in Iraq. News of the alleged plot to attack the base comes amid Europe's largest terror trial in the Spanish capital." The attacker was prepared with PPE, dispersion device capable of spraying large portions of the ship, and his vessel was to be filled with explosives. Brigadier General John Custer: Brigadier General John Custer July 29, 2005 CNN- Global War on Terrorism In internet chat rooms is were money, recruiting, plans, orders, and other tactical information is exchanged 24/7 “Globally”. Slide10: Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Port and Mass Transit GapsMarine Terrorism Response Planning Domestic vs. Federal: Marine Terrorism Response Planning Domestic vs. Federal Local Urban Area Security Initiative-Port and Mass Transit Local jurisdiction domestic Response plan Marine Terrorism Response Plan UASI minimum requirement for planning, training, equipage, and exercises ...i.e. the IED or VIED scenario. TSA MTSA and ISPS Planning Requirements PL 107-295, 116 STAT. 2078 (1) AUTHORITY USE OF FUNDS.—Grants awarded pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be used to develop— ‘‘(B) equipment to accurately detect explosives, or chemical and biological agents, that could be used to commit terrorist acts against the United States; ‘‘(C) equipment to accurately detect nuclear materials, including scintillation-based detection equipment capable of attachment to spreaders to signal the presence of nuclear materials during the unloading of containers; ‘‘(D) improved tags and seals designed for use on shipping containers to track the transportation of the merchandise in such containers, including ‘smart sensors’ that are able to track a container throughout its entire supply chain, detect hazardous and radioactive materials within that container, and transmit such information to the appropriate authorities at a remote location; ‘‘(E) tools to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist act at a port of the United States, including a network of sensors to predict the dispersion of radiological, chemical, or biological agents that might be intentionally or accidentally released; or ‘‘(F) applications to apply existing technologies from other industries to increase overall port security Federal Incidents of National Significance National Response Plan National Maritime Transportation Security Plan Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans Transportation Security Incident (TSI) National Transportation Security Incident National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan (NCP) Spill of National Significance (SONS) Marine Firefighting Contingency Plans Area Maritime Security PlanThe Reality of WMD SAR Responsein the Marine Environment: The Reality of WMD SAR Response in the Marine Environment Response Gap May receive State Response resources within a 3-4 hour timeframe May receive NRP Response resources within a 6-24 hours timeframe Joint civil and military jurisdictions, cross border and Dept/ Agencies, with dual functional response responsibilities plus Currently there is no national standards for immediate WMD SAR in the marine environment. NFPA 472//1006/1470/1405/1670/ WMD SAR Response Capability Gap Situational AnalysisSolutions: Solutions HSPD – 8 National Preparedness HSPD -13 Maritime Security Policy MTSA-ISPS 107-295 (TSA) A Need for Unity of Effort And A Balanced InvestmentSlide14: DHS IG Report 14 MES Port 6 National Response Teams that do not conduct WMD SAR UASI Port there is no State & Local Maritime WMD SAR Response capability Evaluating the terrain: Evaluating the terrain 361 ports Roughly 3,700 maritime facilities Approximately 60,000 ships arrive in the US annually 8,100 foreign flag vessels About 99% of US imports by weight and 80% by dollar value enter the US by “Sea”. That’s 2.4 billion tons of goods valued at more than $1 trillion. Expected to double of the next 2 decades.Unity of Effort and Developing Standards, Universal Compliance & A Balanced Investment: Unity of Effort and Developing Standards, Universal Compliance & A Balanced Investment HSPD 8 No Mention of Maritime No National Standard for maritime WMD SAR competencies Addresses preparedness as a national imperative and requires a national approach HSPD 13 Identifies expedited recovery and response as one of six core elements Priority focus on mining of ports Does institute the need to enhance detect and deter systems Address the need for Domestic Outreach within the constituency of Port Security NFPA Standards Update International SAR Update MTSA-ISPS PL 107-295 (TSA) Required to focus on the capabilities to mitigate CBRNE Terrorism Opportunity: 40 Port Exercise between FY 05-08 The Goal in Context: The Goal in ContextCapabilities-Based Planning: Capabilities-Based Planning Scenarios The National Planning Scenarios highlight the scope, magnitude, and complexity of plausible catastrophic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies Tasks The Universal Task List (UTL) provides a menu of tasks from all sources that may be performed in major events such as those illustrated by the National Planning Scenarios Capabilities The Target Capabilities List (TCL) provides guidance on specific capabilities and levels of capability that Federal, State, local, and tribal entities will be expected to develop and maintain 15 Scenarios Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive, Food and Agricultural, and Cyber Terrorism Natural Disasters Pandemic Influenza Prevention Protection Response Recovery 36 Capability Summaries Description, Outcome, ESF/Annex, Associated Critical Tasks, Measures, Capability Elements, Linked Capabilities, Event Conditions, References Tailored to levels of government based on assigned roles and responsibilities Tailored to Tiers or groups of jurisdictions based on risk factors National Planning Scenarios: National Planning Scenarios Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation – Improvised Nuclear Device – 10k Scenario 2: Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza Scenario 4: Biological Attack – Pneumonic Plague Scenario 5: Chemical Attack – Blister Agent Scenario 6: Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals Scenario 7: Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent Scenario 8: Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion Scenario 9: Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake Scenario 10: Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane Scenario 11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices Scenario 12: Explosives Attack – Improvised Explosive Device Scenario 13: Biological Attack – Food Contamination Scenario 14: Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease Scenario 15: Cyber Attack (Note: China “Unrestricted Warfare”) Established Exercise Methodology and Correct Action ProcessTarget Capabilities-Striking a Balance: Common Planning Interoperable Communications Prevent Mission Area Information Collection and Threat Detection Intelligence Fusion and Analysis Information Sharing and Collaboration Terrorism Investigation and Apprehension CBRNE Detection Protect Mission Area Risk Analysis Critical Infrastructure Protection Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and Testing Citizen Preparedness and Participation Respond Mission Area On-Site Incident Management Emergency Operations Center Management Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Volunteer Management and Donations Worker Health and Safety Public Safety and Security Response Respond Mission Area (cont) Firefighting Operations/Support WMD/Hazardous Incident Response and Decontamination Explosive Device Response Operations Animal Health Emergency Support Environmental Health and Vector Control Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection Isolation and Quarantine Search and Rescue Emergency Public Information and Warning Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Medical Surge Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Mass Prophylaxis Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services) Fatality Management-Continuity of Operation Recover Mission Area Structural Damage Assessment and Mitigation Restoration of Lifelines Economic and Community Recovery Target Capabilities-Striking a BalanceConclusion: Conclusion It will take endless dedication and comment to the task, equal to that of decades past. Establishing the appropriate mechanisms so that the burden is spread appropriately across all constituents and thus sustainable over the long-term.Lessons LearnedRadiation Monitoring in a Port Environment: Lessons Learned Radiation Monitoring in a Port Environment David Martin Director Strategic Defense Programs Tetra Tech EC Inc.Background: Background Prior to the end of the Cold War there was no nuclear smuggling Nuclear smuggling was and is a Post Cold War threat that has since been magnified by the additional threat of terrorist use of these materials A container can deliver a weapon within 5 minutes and 50 feet of its target (more accurate than a Soviet era ballistic missile) How Real is the Threat: How Real is the Threat IAEA Database contains over 550 cases of which more than 370 have been confirmed by the countries in which they took place UN reports a doubling of the number of attempts to smuggle radioactive material over the past five years In horseshoes, hand grenades, and nuclear weapons … close counts Solutions: Solutions Radiation portal monitors are the most effective equipment for border monitoring because: Plastic scintillator detectors are a mature technology in use for over 25 years, that are reliable and easy to install. It is an effective non-intrusive method for searching large volumes of people and cargo. The more you monitor the more you find: The more you monitor the more you find This is the proof of the effectiveness of capable and well utilized radiation portal monitor systemsSlide27: 155 Reactor Fuel Pellets, totally 2.347 kg Low Enriched Uranium What you want to Catch Photograph of Seized Materials – Courtesy of German BKA (Bundeskriminalamt) Slide28: Lest you think this only occurs in Eastern and Central Europe or Central Asia Uranium Fuel Pellets (4% Uranium-235) hidden in matchbox Photograph of Seized Materials – Courtesy of German BKA (Bundeskriminalamt) Limitations of RPM’s in Port Environment: Limitations of RPM’s in Port Environment Mixed cargos Innocent alarms Shielding Calibration Solution Considerations: Solution Considerations Effective system operation is a complex problem It is not just an equipment problem, it is also a procedural and operational problem One cannot be considered in absence of the other Detection and deterrence will not be effective if the equipment is not adequate or if the operations, procedures, and response are not adequate Future Trends: Future Trends DHS is seeking much more complex and sophisticated systems that is much more expensive to procure and maintain in order to automate the process to relieve the burden on enforcement personnel In Europe the emphasis is on training and operations plans that complement the traditional role of enforcement personnel using simpler more robust equipmentKey assumptions for dealing with this threat in the long-term: Key assumptions for dealing with this threat in the long-term Impossible to predict the precise form of the attack Modern terrorists are system analysts Threat will evolve to assure their mission success Conduct of Operations Changes Generational technical evaluations of systems Deployment of countermeasures Threat will drive technology requirements Evolutionary strategy for technology development will be required Cost benefit System integration Conclusions: Conclusions Effective defense requires a systematic and layered approach Radiation Portal Monitors can be an effective tool to combat the illicit movement of nuclear/radioactive materials However, the instruments must be properly implemented and the limitations of the instruments must be considered in light of the threat Radiation monitoring is only part of the solution to the problem of nuclear smuggling or the threat of nuclear terrorism Slide34: Chemical / Biological / Radiological / Nuclear (CBRN) Threats in the Port Environment Q & A You do not have the permission to view this presentation. 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