Lsn 27 SASO

Support and Stability Operations: 

Support and Stability Operations Lsn 27

Agenda: 

Agenda Increased Optempo Definitions Themes Support Operations Example case studies Stability Operations Example case studies

Increased Optempo: 

Increased Optempo After the end of the Cold War and the tremendous success of Desert Storm, there was an increased willingness to use the military Previously reserved largely for “vital” interests, the military became increasingly used for lesser interests under a strategy of “engagement and enlargement”

Increased Optempo: 

Increased Optempo The pace of deployments increased 16-fold since the end of the Cold War. Between 1960 and 1991, the Army conducted 10 operations outside of normal training and alliance commitments, but between 1992 and 1998, the Army conducted 26 such operations. The Marines conducted 15 contingency operations between 1982 and 1989, and 62 since 1989. During the 1990s, U.S. forces of 20,000 or more troops were engaged in non-warfighting missions in Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1996), and Iraq and Kuwait (1998). The Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, Jack Spencer, Executive Summary #1394

Stability Operations: 

Stability Operations “Promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis” FM 3-0, p. 1-15

Support Operations: 

Support Operations “ Support Operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering” FM 3-0, p. 1-16

SASO Patterns and Themes: 

SASO Patterns and Themes Nontraditional environments. The enemy. Noncombatants. The political-military dimension. Changing missions and mission creep. Operational constraints, including rules of engagement (ROE). The role of combat troops. Cross-cultural interaction. Yates, Military Support and Stability Operations, Military Review, Jul-Aug 97

Support to Domestic Civil Authorities: 

Support to Domestic Civil Authorities Can include support for Disaster Relief, Humanitarian Assistance, and Suppression of Domestic Violence or Insurrection Posse Comitatus prevents Federal soldiers from executing the law in the place of duly appointed law enforcement means without specific approval Examples: LA Riots and Hurricane Andrew

LA Riots: 

LA Riots

LA Riots(Non-traditional environment): 

LA Riots (Non-traditional environment) 29 April 1992: Police officers acquitted in beating trial of Rodney King Most destructive civil disturbance in US history, causing the deaths of at least 54 people and more than $800 million in property damage throughout LA County. More than 10,000 troops from the California National Guard (CANG), 2,000 active component soldiers, and 1,500 Marines were deployed to the area at the height of operations.

Posse Comitatis and the LA Riots(Operational constraints): 

Posse Comitatis and the LA Riots (Operational constraints) “The CANG's procedure for approving law enforcement requests had been rapid and gave maximum discretion to subordinate commanders to coordinate directly with the supported law enforcement entities. Before the establishment of JTF-LA and the federalization of the CANG, virtually 100 percent of law enforcement support requests had been approved. Following federalization, only about 20 percent were approved.” After-action briefing by the California National Guard Plans, Operations, and Military Support Officer; June 8-11, Reno, Nevada.

Posse Comitatis and the LA Riots(Operational constraints): 

Posse Comitatis and the LA Riots (Operational constraints) “It [JTF-LA] required each request for assistance to be subjected to a nebulous test to determine whether the requested assignment constituted a law enforcement or a military function. As a result, after the federalization on May 1 . . . not only were the federal troops rendered largely unavailable for most assignments requested by the LAPD, but the National Guard, under federal command, was made subject to the same restrictions, and therefore had to refuse many post-federalization requests for help.” William Webster, former FBI Director

Training and LA Riots(Cross- cultural interaction): 

Training and LA Riots (Cross- cultural interaction) "Police officers responded to a domestic dispute, accompanied by Marines. They had just gone up to the door when two shotgun birdshot rounds were fired through the door, hitting the officers. One yelled ‘cover me!’ to the Marines, who then laid down a heavy base of fire. . . . The police officer had not meant ‘shoot’ when he yelled ‘cover me’ to the Marines. [He] meant . . . point your weapons and be prepared to respond if necessary. However, the Marines responded instantly in the precise way they had been trained, where ‘cover me’ means provide me with cover using firepower. . . . over two hundred bullets [were] fired into that house.” James D. Delk, Fires & Furies: The L.A. Riots

LA Riots Review: 

LA Riots Review Discuss in terms of Nontraditional environment Operational constraints Cross-cultural interaction

Hurricane Andrew: 

Hurricane Andrew

Hurricane Andrew(Non-traditional environment and “enemy”): 

Hurricane Andrew (Non-traditional environment and “enemy”) Hurricane Andrew made landfall on 24 August 1992, just south of Miami Beach A Category 4 storm, with winds upwards of 175 miles per hour. Andrew would ultimately become the most expensive natural disaster in American history. Virtually flattened the communities of Homestead and Florida City. More than 60 people were killed and scores more injured, 117,000 homes were destroyed or suffered major damage, some two million residents had to be temporarily evacuated. Overall estimates placed the storm’s cost at more than $20 billion. Nearly 10,000 active duty soldiers (from Forts Bragg, Lee, Drum, and elsewhere) joined approximately 7,000 Florida National Guard soldiers on the scene in Florida.

Posse Comitatus Issues During Hurricane Andrew(Operational constraints): 

Posse Comitatus Issues During Hurricane Andrew (Operational constraints) National Guard left under state control to perform a predominantly law and order function Lesson learned from LA Riots Federal troops deterred crime by their presence and reported criminal activity Federal troops linked to police by radio Sullivan, Army, Jan 93, pg. 19-21

Services Offered During Hurricane Andrew(Role of combat troops): 

Services Offered During Hurricane Andrew (Role of combat troops) Meals and water Housing Donated goods distribution Medical Repair work Counseling Debris removal Communications/information broadcasts Sullivan Army, Jan 93, pg. 20

Hurricane Andrew Review: 

Hurricane Andrew Review Discuss in terms of Nontraditional environments. The enemy. Operational constraints The role of combat troops.

Stability Operations: 

Stability Operations

Stability Operations: 

Stability Operations “Promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis” FM 3-0, p. 1-15

Types of Stability Operations: 

Types of Stability Operations Peace Operations... Operation Power Pack (Dominican Republic) Foreign Internal Defense… El Salvador Security Assistance…Partnership for Peace (Europe) Humanitarian and Civic Assistance…Operation Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq) Support to Insurgencies… Contras (Nicaragua) Support to Counter Drug Operations…Operation Blast Furnace (Bolivia) Combating Terrorism… Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations…Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) Arms Control…IFOR and SFOR (Bosnia) Show of Force… Operation Vigilant Warrior (Kuwait) FM 3-0. P. 9-6

Peace Operations: 

Peace Operations Peacekeeping Operations Require consent of all parties involved in the dispute Monitor cease fire, truce, etc Support diplomatic efforts to support long term political settlements Force used as last resort Peace Enforcement Operations Apply or threaten military force to Compel compliance Restore or maintain peace Do not require consent of all parties FM 3-0. P. 9-6,7

Peace Enforcement: 

Peace Enforcement Subordinate Operations: Forcible separation of belligerents Establishment and supervision of protected areas Sanction and exclusion zone enforcement Movement denial and guarantee Restoration and maintenance of order Protection of humanitarian assistance FM 3-0, p 9-7

Operation Power Pack (Dominican Republic): 

Operation Power Pack (Dominican Republic)

Power Pack(Noncombatants and enemy): 

Power Pack (Noncombatants and enemy) On 24 April 1965 a group of rebels which included communists initiated a coup in the Dominican Republic. US Marines and 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne intervened to protect American lives and to prevent a possible “second Cuba.” Organization of American States declares a 9 mile International Security Zone

Power Pack(Changing missions): 

Power Pack (Changing missions) Objective “Your announced mission is to save American lives. Your unstated mission is to prevent the Dominican Republic from going Communist.” (General Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) (Remember, peace enforcement operations do not require neutrality or consent. Peacekeeping operations do.)

International Security Zone: 

International Security Zone ISZ intended to be an “international neutral zone”

Subsequent Missions: 

Subsequent Missions Food distribution Personnel searches

Subsequent Missions (continued): 

Subsequent Missions (continued) Checkpoint operations Patrolling

Power Pack(Political-military dimension): 

Power Pack (Political-military dimension) Political Control “One thing that must be remembered... is that the command of squads has now been transferred to Washington and is not necessarily limited to the Pentagon either.” (General Harold Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army) “Had a general officer not possessed of Palmer's ‘political sensitivity’ been in charge of the U. S. forces, the outcome of the crisis might have been decidedly different.” (Lawrence Yates)

Power Pack(Operational constraints): 

Power Pack (Operational constraints) ROE The fact that most fighting would take place in Santo Domingo limited use of some heavy weapons. Extremely restrictive: Initially, don’t fire unless fired upon. Eventually, don’t fire unless your position was in imminent danger of being overrun. Discipline The “exceptional personal discipline [of the soldiers] had been a major factor in the successful accomplishment of their mission." (Charles Moskos)

Power Pack Review: 

Power Pack Review Discuss in terms of The enemy. Noncombatants. The political-military dimension. Changing missions and mission creep. The ISZ as a ZOS and other subsequent missions. Operational constraints. Peacekeeping or peace enforcement?

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Assistance provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises Must enhance security interests of both the US and host nation Planned activities with specific budget limitations and may be in only certain categories FM 3-0, p 9-10

Somalia: 

Somalia

Operation Restore Hope: 

Operation Restore Hope Clan violence in Somalia interfered with international famine relief efforts, and President Bush sent American troops to protect relief workers. The US-led coalition approved by the Security Council in December 1992 had a mandate of protecting humanitarian operations and creating a secure environment for eventual political reconciliation. At the same time, it had the authority to use all necessary means, including military force. Operation Restore Hope was a US-led, UN-sanctioned operation that included protection of humanitarian assistance and other peace-enforcement operations. While the humanitarian mission is quickly achieved, US force found itself dragged into Somalia's internecine battles, culminating in the battle of Mogadishu.

Slide37: 

- 49 different humanitarian agencies and relief organizations Forces from 21 different countries 10TH MOUNTAIN AAR Humanitarian Assistance (Cross-cultural interaction)

Success(Role of combat troops): 

Success (Role of combat troops) The Army force (ARFOR) AO included over 21,000 square miles. Over these distances, units conducted air assault operations, patrols, security operations, cordons and searches, and other combat operations in support of humanitarian agencies. Other ARFOR operations included building or rebuilding over 1,100 kilometers of roads, constructing two Bailey Bridges, escorting hundreds of convoys, confiscating thousands of weapons, and providing theater communications. Due to these efforts, humanitarian agencies declared an end to the food emergency, community elders became empowered, and marketplaces were revitalized and functioning.

Problems (Changing missions and mission creep): 

Problems (Changing missions and mission creep) In March 1993 the U.N. officially took over the operation, naming this mission UNOSOM II. The objective of this mission was to promote “nation building” within Somalia. One main target was to disarm the Somali people. UNOSOM II stressed restoring law and order, improving the infrastructure, and assisting the people with setting up a representative government.

Problems(Enemy): 

Problems (Enemy) This change of mission was a direct threat to the power base of clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid On 3 Oct 1993 Task Force Ranger raided the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu to search for Aidid. This led to a 17 hour battle in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and 84 were wounded.

Withdrawal(Political-military dimension): 

Withdrawal (Political-military dimension) On 7 Oct, President Clinton announced the beginning of the US withdrawal. Marks the beginning of a period in which the US becomes very “casualty adverse” High optempo use of the Army in SASO lessens Army not used in Kosovo

Somalia Review: 

Somalia Review Discuss in terms of The role of combat troops The enemy. Changing missions and mission creep. Cross-cultural interaction. Political-military dimension.

Show of Force: 

Show of Force An operation designed to demonstrate US resolve, which involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation, that if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives Conducted to Bolster and reassure allies Deter potential aggressors Gain or increase influence FM 3-0, p. 9-13

Show of Force: 

Show of Force Three Reasons: Bolster and reassure allies Deter potential aggressors Gain or increase influence

Operation Golden Pheasant: 

Operation Golden Pheasant

Nicaragua and Honduras: 

Nicaragua and Honduras The Sandinistas assumed power in Nicaragua in 1979. In 1981, the Reagan administration suspended U.S. aid to Nicaragua, charging that Nicaragua, with the aid of Cuba and the Soviet Union, was supplying arms to rebels in El Salvador. Later that year, Nicaraguan guerrillas known as “Contras,” began a war to overthrow the Sandinistas. In 1987 the U.S. Congress approved 7.7 million in humanitarian aid to the Contras

1988 Border IncidentHonduras and Nicaragua(Political-military dimension): 

1988 Border Incident Honduras and Nicaragua (Political-military dimension) On 3 Feb Congress votes to terminate aid to contras This development forces contras to defend what supplies they have on hand On 10 Mar about 2,000 Sandinistas cross border Poor Contra response Honduras requests US combat troops US refuses, but offers symbolic training exercise instead ANDERSON, NEWSWEEK, 28 MAR 88, pg. 37

Operation Golden Pheasant: 

Operation Golden Pheasant Show of force Combined training with Hondurans By the third day of the exercise, US infantry and artillery units linked up with the Hondurans to train 2,000 troops from the 82d Abn Div and 1,100 from the 7th ID Excellent deployability Entire deployment completed within 33 hours of first aircraft going wheels up Contributes to 23 Mar cease fire ENNIS, MILITARY REVIEW, MAR 89

Golden Pheasant(Non-traditional environment): 

Golden Pheasant (Non-traditional environment) Large media coverage From 17 to 27 Mar; there were more than 500 media personnel on the ground in Honduras ENNIS, MILITARY REVIEW, MAR 89

Golden Pheasant Lessons Learned: 

Golden Pheasant Lessons Learned Discuss in terms of Nontraditional environments. The political-military dimension.

Homework: 

Homework Read “Decisive Force Now Measured by Speed” http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_76_Washington%20Times.doc