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Premium member Presentation Transcript A Comparison of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-89) and the Iraqi Insurgency (2003): A Review of the: Tactics Weapons Training and Composition: A Comparison of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-89) and the Iraqi Insurgency (2003): A Review of the: Tactics Weapons Training and Composition By C. L. Staten CEO and Sr. National Security Analyst Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI)Time Magazine – Who Are The Enemy? : Time Magazine – Who Are The Enemy? Sunday, Dec. 07, 2003 New York -- U.S. intelligence experts now believe the Iraq insurgents are a volatile mix of groups and free-lancers who include loyalists of the former ruling Ba’ath Party, Fedayeen militiamen, former Republican Guard and intelligence agents, foreign jihadi fighters, professional terrorists, paid common criminals and disaffected Iraqis, TIME's Brian Bennett and Michael Ware reported from Iraq. Source: Time Magazine -- On the internet at: URL: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,557021,00.htmlShould We Care What Happened in Afghanistan During the 1980’s??: Should We Care What Happened in Afghanistan During the 1980’s?? The primary reason is that those who fought the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan are now the (1) mentors (2) planners, and (3)terrorism instructors for thousands of Mujahideen, that are now engaging Coalition Forces in Iraq and elsewhere…Foreign Terrorist Elements – Afghan Arabs: Who Are the Afghan-Arabs? In the 1980s, thousands of Arab men left the Middle-East and N. Africa, often with the assistance of their governments, to help Afghanistan -- a fellow Muslim nation -- in its fight against Soviet invaders. At the end of the Afghan-Soviet war, thousand of the so-called “Afghan Arabs” chose to remain in Afghanistan. They have since been referred to as “Afghan Arabs” by counter-terrorism experts. Foreign Terrorist Elements – Afghan ArabsForeign Terrorist Elements – Afghan Arabs: Foreign Terrorist Elements – Afghan Arabs What do the Afghan Arabs believe? -- For Arab Afghans, existing Arab and Islamic governments are ‘infidel’ and non-Islamic (i.e. Saudi Arabia) -- The non-Muslim world is divided into enemies and non-enemies; the United States and the "West" are among the enemies. The West includes Britain and France, because of colonial-era polices and continued intervention in Muslim regions. Canada, Australia and Germany are also enemies, because their troops participated in the war in Afghanistan. Latin American and Scandinavian countries are perceived as neutral. Foreign Terrorist Elements – Afghan Arabs: Foreign Terrorist Elements – Afghan Arabs What is their motivation for attacking the West? --"Holy" war is the duty of all Muslims to change governments. Coups, revolutions and violence is encouraged. Innocent civilians killed in this fight will go to paradise as martyrs. -- Participation in governments is prohibited; however, participation in military institutions is encouraged as a way of preparing for holy war, and eliminating target governments in the future. -- Secularism is a Western idea that contradicts Islam, and should guide Muslims' every step. Saddam Loyalists & Mohammed’s Army: Saddam Loyalists & Mohammed’s Army “Another organization calling itself Mohammed's Army, or Jaish Mohammed, is an umbrella group of former intelligence agents, army and security officials, and Ba’ath Party members,” ERRI analysts said. Membership in Baghdad's “loyalist” insurgent groups appears to be at least partially fueled by Sunni Muslims who were favored under Saddam Hussein. Iraq Insurgency: State of Development: Iraq Insurgency: State of Development Iraqi insurgency in Baghdad appears to have a central leadership that finances attacks in the capital and gives broad direction. One-hundred guerrillas in 8 to 12 separate rebel bands, were identified by U.S. Army intelligence. Individual attacks against U.S. occupation forces in the capital are left up to the men who carry them out. There is no sign of an military-style command structure in the city or in Iraq as a whole, military sources are looking at operational independent cells.Mercenaries??: Mercenaries?? Former Hussein regime officers allegedly pay for terrorist services of Saudis, Kuwaitis, Syrians, Jordanians, Egyptians and Yemenis. "There are groups coming from abroad who are well-paid to carry out terrorist actions in Iraq," one analyst said. Kuwait and Iran are two specific sources of terrorist manpower. © Copyright, 2003, Emergency Response & Research Institute and the author. All rights reserved. This presentation contains military and law enforcement sensitive information and should not be distributed to the general public. Contact email@example.com for more information about any usage of this presentation.Who Are Our Ultimate Enemies in Iraq??: Who Are Our Ultimate Enemies in Iraq?? Alleged Iraqi plot by Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group, led by Abu Musab Al-Zaraqawi Khomeini Hussein Bin Laden & ZawahiriAnticipated 4GW TacticsIn Foreseeable Future: Ambushes involving automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) or mortars. Planted mines, command or remote detonated mines and improvised explosive devices. Snipers and covert shooting attacks. Delay detonated car/truck bombs. Homicide/suicide bombers, attacking high density (and soft) targets – to include transportation systems and markets, shopping areas. Provoking of U.S./Coalition forces into overreacting, which could provide hostile propaganda. Generating widespread disturbances designed to stress the resources of the opposing force. Kidnappings & hostage taking. [As anticipated by ERRI analysts] Anticipated 4GW Tactics In Foreseeable FutureWeaponry of the InsurgentsRPG-7: Weaponry of the Insurgents RPG-7 The RPG-7 antitank grenade launcher was the Afghan Mujahideen’s weapon of choice. We are now seeing the same weapons in Iraq. Late in the Afghan conflict guerillas began to use heavy caliber machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks, mortars, and multiple rocket launch systems… we are just beginning to see this as well in Iraq.Other Important Weapons of Both the Afghan and Iraqi Insurgency: Other Important Weapons of Both the Afghan and Iraqi Insurgency An increasingly difficult problem involves the use of Surface to Air Missiles (SAMS)…used to target both rotary and fixed wing coalition aircraft. A recent example of this tactic involved the 22 Nov, 2003 attack on DHL Airbus A300 cargo plane that was departing Baghdad airport. Guerillas prepare to fire SA-7 (L) & SA-14 (R) SAMSExplosive Devices used in Both Theaters: Explosive Devices used in Both Theaters Another weapon that has been used extensively in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). These devices have been detonated by command, timed and delayed methods. Suitcase bomb IEDS: Improvised Explosive DevicesRoadside Bombs in Iraq - I: Roadside Bombs in Iraq - I Military munitions are converted into improvised devices. Ammo depots of the former Hussein regime are being utilized by guerillas to kill and wound Coalition Forces. (Below left) 152/155mm artillery shell encased in concrete (for shrapnel) Photo credit: DoD, U.S. Army Engineer SchoolSlide16: Camouflaged roadside bombs in Iraq are piles of rocks that provide (additional shrapnel) with an IED hidden underneath Roadside Bombs in Iraq - II Multiple IEDS, connected by hardwire to OP, and command detonated as convoy passes. Photo credit: DoD, U.S. Army Engineer SchoolSlide17: Roadside Bombs in Iraq - III Sources for all IED specific slides: Briefing, DoD, U.S. Army Engineer School, with a special thanks to John Donovan Slide18: Roadside Bombs in Iraq - IV Sources for all IED specific slides: Briefing, DoD, U.S. Army Engineer School, with a special thanks to John Donovan Suicide/Homicide Vehicle Bombers: Suicide/Homicide Vehicle Bombers The use of (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices – VBIED) by suicide/homicide bombers is a tactic that was not used during the Afghan/Russian war in the 80’s. This has become an increasingly frequent tactic of fanatics in Iraq against U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. United Nations Bombing Jordanian Embassy BombingTwo Methods of Attack??: Two Methods of Attack?? An ERRI analyst stated,”It is suggested that one must distinguish between the frequent, low-level hit-and-run attacks on US forces on the one hand and the far more sinister suicide car bombings which have killed so many civilians on the other.” Those behind the roadside bombings, the sniping incidents and the RPG attacks on coalition troops are thought to be a mixture of Saddam loyalists, untrained Arab volunteers and ordinary Iraqis who have a score to settle with the US military for killing members of their family during the war. The big car bomb attacks are more likely to include foreign terrorist elements (al-Qaeda affiliates), possibly working in collaboration with members of the former regime. U.S. and Coalition Intervention Tactics: U.S. and Coalition Intervention Tactics Small unit leadership, especially at the junior non-commissioned officer level, is critical to tactical success in urban operations. All movement (including infantry) must use "bounding and over-watch" techniques. During movement in open areas, units using bounding and over-watch have significantly reduced casualties compared to units that did not. Intelligence, especially from human sources, is absolutely critical to successful urban operations. Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAV’s) can provide real-time intelligence. The problem appears to be the process used by analysts who have difficulty interpreting it. (See next slide) © Copyright, 2003, Emergency Response & Research Institute and the author. All rights reserved. This presentation contains military and law enforcement sensitive information and should not be distributed to the general public. Contact firstname.lastname@example.org for more information about any usage of this presentation.Terrorism Counter-Measures: Using Technology to Our Advantage: Terrorism Counter-Measures: Using Technology to Our Advantage Another of the counter-measures to the deadly ambushes that continue to plague U.S. and Coalition convoys is an on-going surveillance of convoy routes. Predator drones, helicopters, satellites and other kinds of “overhead” technology can be used to contradict the guerilla advantage and help prevent using IED’s as a surprise… Interdiction Techniques and Considerations for Military/Law Enforcement Personnel - I: Interdiction Techniques and Considerations for Military/Law Enforcement Personnel - I “Close and negotiate” tactics should not be attempted. The desire of the suspect is not suicide; it is homicide. They will attempt to detonate their device if they believe they are discovered. Switches are on the chest area or held in the hands. Other Middle East terrorist devices include cell phones for command detonation. Do not discount the fact that the bomb may have a “fail safe” cell phone initiator so an observer could detonate the explosives should the bomber become incapacitated. The standard police tactic of closing distance on a “suicidal” suspect in order to try to reason with them only increases the probability that the “good guys” will become homicide victim(s). The homicide bomber is not despondent. They may be religiously motivated to the point of fanaticism so rational negotiations may be futile. Improvised Explosive DevicesInterdiction Techniques and Considerations for Military/Law Enforcement Personnel - II: Interdiction Techniques and Considerations for Military/Law Enforcement Personnel - II If timely verification of a “homicide bomber,” is made then deadly force is authorized. Deadly force decisions must be based on local policies, procedures and rules of engagement, and must meet legal requirements. Note that there is considerable concern that a “center of mass shot” might set off an explosive charge if that is where the payload is being carried by the suspect. Local tactics and training should take this into account. Improvised Explosive DevicesInterdiction Techniques and Considerations for Military/Law Enforcement Personnel - III: Interdiction Techniques and Considerations for Military/Law Enforcement Personnel - III If or when the bomber is incapacitated, either through direct police action or explosives detonation, no attempt should be made to approach and render aid to the suspect. Secondary devices should be expected such as a second suicide bomber, accomplices with an additional device, or pre-set vehicle bombs staged along main emergency routes to the scene. It should be noted that most explosive devices also contain fragmentation such as nails, nuts and bolts to maximize the deadly effects of the blast and kill or injure as many people as possible. Area evacuation should be completed, a crime scene cordon set up, and a bomb squad should be called to approach and evaluate the suspect and the scene for actual presence of explosives. Improvised Explosive DevicesInterdiction Techniques and Considerations for Military/Law Enforcement Personnel - IV: Interdiction Techniques and Considerations for Military/Law Enforcement Personnel - IV If the suspect is neutralized and there is no explosion, do not immediately move to render aid. Retreat to a point of observation a minimum of 900’ from the suspect, and call for the bomb squad. The suspect may be alive and could detonate the explosives upon your approach either deliberately or unconsciously. Many of the bombers are unaware they have been accompanied by an individual with the capability of remotely detonating the device. Keep this in mind before any approach is conducted. Be prepared to fire again if the suspect attempts to flee or is otherwise moving. Even if the suspect appears dead, do not approach as the explosives could have anti-disturbance devices, a timer, or other mechanisms meant to cause a detonation. A bomb squad or EOD personnel should make the initial approach to a downed suspect using robotics or bomb suits…even if their arrival may be delayed. Improvised Explosive DevicesERRI & EmergencyNet NewsWe Monitor the World for You!: ERRI & Emergency Net News We Monitor the World for You! More Information?? EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ERRI) EmergencyNet News Service 6348 North Milwaukee Avenue - #312, Chicago, Illinois 60646, USA Voice/Voice Mail: 773-631-ERRI Fax: 773-631-4703 Internet E-Mail: email@example.com Web Page: www.emergency.com © Copyright, 2003, Emergency Response & Research Institute and the author. All rights reserved. This presentation contains military and law enforcement sensitive information and should not be distributed to the general public. 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