Vietnam: Part IIUses of Air Power : Vietnam: Part II Uses of Air Power
Uses of Air PowerBackground : Uses of Air Power Background War was primarily a land war -- most air power used in conjunction with ground operations
North stayed above DMZ, so air superiority over the South was never a concern
In-country operations centered around interdiction, close air support, airlift, recon, search and rescue, and air refueling
Uses of Air PowerBackground : Uses of Air Power Background After Tonkin, U.S. air units built up rapidly
U.S. Air Force occupied 10 major air bases
All were built and defended by the Air Force
Huge logistical effort
Also flew from 6 bases in Thailand
Navy flew from carriers in
Gulf of Tonkin
B-52s flew from Guam and,
at times, from the U.S.
Uses of Air Power1964 to 1968 : Uses of Air Power 1964 to 1968 Forestall suspected enemy offensives
Defend and supply isolated outposts
Interdict the Southern end of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
a series of roads and paths
through the dense jungle
North Vietnam’s primary supply route into South Vietnam
Uses of Air PowerDuring Vietnamization (1969-73) : Uses of Air Power During Vietnamization (1969-73) Train the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF)
Support the South Vietnamese Army
Forestall suspected enemy attacks against withdrawing
American units
Uses of Air PowerInterdiction : Uses of Air Power Interdiction A major mission during SEA war: prevent supplies from reaching communist forces in the south
Aircraft used: F-4 Phantom, F-100 Super Sabre, F-105 Thunderchief (Thud), AC-130 Gunships
Best known interdiction aircraft was the B-52-a nuclear bomber modified to carry
conventional bombs
Arc Light--Name for B-52
interdiction missions
Uses of Air PowerClose Air Support : Uses of Air Power Close Air Support Missions to support forces of the ground
Aircraft used: A-4 Skyhawk, F-4, F-100, A-37 Dragonfly, A-1 Skyraider and AC-47 Gunships (Puff the Magic Dragon)
Gunships, cargo aircraft armed with rapid-fire machine guns, were very effective
Forward Air Controllers (FACs) were used to locate the enemy and mark targets for faster flying jets
Close Air Support ( Cont) : Close Air Support ( Cont) B-52 Arc Light aircraft were occasionally used for close air support
B-52s were used extensively in close air support at Khe Sanh
Flew 2,548 sorties and dropped bombs within 300 yards of of US Marine perimeter
B-52 credited with saving Khe Sanh and repelling the Tet and Easter Offensives
Uses of Air PowerStrategic/Tactical Airlift : Uses of Air Power Strategic/Tactical Airlift Vital to successful U.S. operations because of poor security on roads and poor condition of Southern seaports
Aircraft used: UH-1 Hueys, C-7 Caribous, C-123 Providers, and C-130 Hercules
Missions often flown while under attack
Supplies often air-dropped because of enemy fire and poor landing facilities
Uses of Air PowerReconnaissance : Uses of Air Power Reconnaissance Aircraft used: RF-4C, RB-57 Canberra, and RB-66 Destroyers
Aircraft were equipped with variety of cameras and sensing devices
Missions consisted of locating lucrative targets and assessing battle damage
A valuable part of repelling Tet and protecting Khe Sanh
Uses of Air PowerSearch and Rescue : Uses of Air Power Search and Rescue An extremely important part of the air support mission throughout Southeast Asia
Buttressed aircrew morale -- fliers knew every effort would be made to save them if shot down
Aircraft used: HH-3 Jolly Green Giants and HH-53 Super Jolly Greens
By ’73, USAF had rescued 3,883 Americans
Uses of Air PowerAir to Air Refueling : Uses of Air Power Air to Air Refueling Indispensable -- extended the range of combat aircraft and enabled many aircraft to return safely
C-130s refueled helicopters, KC-135s refueled fixed wing aircraft
SAC tankers flew 195,000 sorties, unloaded 9 billion pounds of fuel and took part in 814,000 individual refuelings
Campaigns:“Rolling Thunder” : Campaigns: “Rolling Thunder” Officially began 2 March 1965
Objectives
Interdict the flow of supplies from the North
Force the North to stop supporting the Vietcong and quit the war
Raise South Vietnamese morale
Rolling Thunder : Rolling Thunder Strategic bombing and interdiction campaign
Strategic because it was aimed at the North’s will to wage war
Interdiction because the North had few large industries and got most of their material from China and the Soviet Union
Employed mostly tactical aircraft -- F-105s, F-4s and F-111s -- B-52s used in ‘66 in the Southern part of North Vietnam
Rolling ThunderRestrictions : Rolling Thunder Restrictions Johnson administration controlled campaign tightly
Restriction imposed by civilians included:
Hanoi, Haiphong, China border -- off limits
MIG bases and non-firing SAM sites--off limits
Dams, dikes, hydroelectric plants--off limits
White House selected targets, weapons and flying routes – with little military input
Rolling Thunder : Rolling Thunder Graduated increases in bombing intensity worked to advantage of North Vietnamese
Gave them time to recover from damage
Allowed them to establish the world’s most intense antiaircraft defense system
Provided them the will to fight on and a sense they could survive
By 1965, it became clear that Rolling Thunder didn’t work
Rolling Thunder : Rolling Thunder Impacts
South’s morale improved as the North suffered under the bombing
North used frequent halts and restrictions to repair damage and resupply forces in South
Criticism grew at home and internationally
Johnson ended Rolling Thunder prior to 1968 elections
Campaign, America’s longest, was a failure
Linebacker I : Linebacker I Easter Offensive (Mar 72) made it apparent the North was not willing to negotiate
Objectives of Linebacker
Initially a close air support effort to aid retreating South Vietnamese forces
Later, changed to an interdiction campaign against North Vietnam
A systematic campaign with little civilian control -- unlike Rolling Thunder
Linebacker I : Linebacker I Civilian casualties were a consideration but didn’t determine how missions were flown
Haiphong harbor was mined for the first time to restrict in-coming supplies
Strikes were flown over Hanoi and Haiphong
B-52 strikes on Haiphong began April ‘72
“Smart bombs” were used extensively
Linebacker I : Linebacker I Linebacker I was the most successful U.S. bombing campaign of the war
Had more impact on the North Vietnam in 9 months than Rolling Thunder did in 4 years
Successful largely because Easter Offensive was a conventional, mechanized attack
Peace Talks resumed in July 1972
Nixon restricted Linebacker I attacks to below the 20th parallel
Linebacker II : Linebacker II Peace Talks stalled again in Dec 72
Nixon ordered Linebacker II to run concurrently with Linebacker I
Purpose of Linebacker II was to force the North Vietnamese to negotiate and sign a peace treaty
Ran from 18 Dec to 30 Dec 1972 -- referred to as the “Christmas Campaign”
Linebacker II : Linebacker II Very intense and logistically complex
Specific targets in Hanoi and Haiphong
B-52s used for the first time over Hanoi
By the end of Linebacker II, North Vietnam was defenseless
1,200 SAMs were fired
80% of the North’s electrical systems and 25% of their POL facilities were destroyed
Linebacker II : Linebacker II North Vietnam returned to the bargaining table 30 Dec 72
All bombing ceased on 15 Jan 73
Peace treaty was signed on 27 Jan 73
Linebacker II was a success
Some believe that if Rolling Thunder had been conducted like Linebacker II, the war would have ended in 65 -- unlikely
Summary : Summary Uses of Airpower
Interdiction Close Air Support
Airlift Air Refueling
Reconnaissance Search and Rescue
Rolling Thunder
Linebacker I
Linebacker II
Additional Vietnam Information, Part IILessons Learned : Additional Vietnam Information, Part II Lessons Learned
The War in Southeast AsiaCosts to the U.S. : The War in Southeast Asia Costs to the U.S. 58,135 Americans killed, 153,000 wounded, 2500 missing in action
$141 billion spent
6.3 million tons of bombs dropped (12 times more than Korea, 2 times more than WW II)
2,257 aircraft lost ($3.1 billion value)
5.2 million combat sorties flown
The War in Southeast AsiaResults : U.S. reluctance to enter military conflicts that don’t directly threaten national interests
Congressional restriction on President’s ability to commit U.S. military forces
Lessened public opinion of the government and the military
The all-volunteer military force
Increased emphasis on military resources, training, and weapons The War in Southeast Asia Results
The War in Southeast AsiaLessons Learned : The War in Southeast Asia Lessons Learned U.S. can’t win a counterinsurgency war in another country--only the people of that country can
Force and technology are of limited value in a “people’s war”
Before committing force, national leaders leaders must base decisions on realistic assessments
More Lessons Learned : More Lessons Learned Know your enemy and know yourself
“Graduated Response” is an ineffective way to employ air power -- reduces surprise, flexibility and concentration of force
In a democracy, congressional and public support are critical, and difficult to get
Modern war is open to public scrutiny
Let those who understand war conduct it
Competencies : Competencies Air Superiority
Precision Engagement
Global Attack
Rapid Global Mobility
Agile Combat Support
Functions : Functions Counterland
Close Air Support
Interdiction
Airlift
Reconnaissance
Search and Rescue
Air Refueling
Strategic Attack
Doctrine : Doctrine Strategic attack and nuclear deterrence prior to Vietnam
Shift towards deterrence through strength and global attack