Slide1 : Office of
International Regimes and Agreements
NA-243 ECCO Seminar May 2005 Richard Goorevich
Director
(202) 586-2331
NA-243: Technical Lead on Nuclear Technology for USG : NA-243: Technical Lead on Nuclear Technology for USG Functional Overview Domestic Controls International Controls Surplus Equipment
Deemed Exports
Nuclear Software
CRADAs
NCI/IPP
NP Seminar Series
ECI
Part 810
Authorizations
Munitions
Dual-Use
NRC Assurances NSG
Zangger Cmtee
Wassenaar Arrgmt.
Add’l Protocol
MTCR/AG
Safeguards
Policy
Additional Protocol
Implementation
IAEA Board of
Governors and
General Conference DOE Complex Industry Multilateral Safeguards Other Support to
DHS/CBP
DHS/ICE
DHS/U.S. Coast Guard
FBI
DOC/BIS/EE
NA-20 DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION Deputy Administrator - Paul M. Longsworth : OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES & AGREEMENTS Director - Rich Goorevich Budget - Lynn Ashby (FED) Admin - Renetta Zanco (GEM) Travel - Joanne Frysiak (GEM) Acting Policy Director Adam Scheinman OFFICE OF GLOBAL SECURITY, COMPLIANCE & COOPERATION Director - Monte Mallin OFFICE OF DISMANTLEMENT & TRANSPARENCY Director - Kurt Siemen LICENSING OPERATIONS AND COMPLIANCE Deputy Director - Anatoli Welihozkiy PINS – Barbara McIntosh 03/28/2008 9:50 PM U.S. Domestic Export Licensing (DOC/DOS/NRC/810s) DOE-Complex issues associated w/equipment and technology Interagency enforcement support COUNTERING PROLIFERANT NETWORKS Deputy Director - Bob Swartz Coordinates the following IRA crosscutting activities: Proliferation networks coordination (PSI … ) Asian Affairs NON-NUCLEAR SECURITY Team Leader - Vacant INTERNATIONAL TREATIES NUCLEAR SUPPLY & TRANSFERS Team Leader - Melissa Krupa NUCLEAR TREATIES & AGREEMENTS Team Leader - Sean Oehlbert NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS Team Leader – Jon Phillips Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS Australia Group Missile Technology Control Regime Wassenaar Arrangement DOMESTIC (NON-NUCLEAR LICENSING) International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Non-Nuclear Interdiction Groups (MTAG/Shield) Sanctions Work DOMESTIC (NUCLEAR LICENSING) Nuclear Referral List from EAR / ITAR Technology Transfers (Part 810) Nuclear Interdiction (NIAG) Classified Tech Transfer MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS NPT Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) IAEA AFFAIRS NUTRAN Physical Protection: Bilats, IPPAS, CPPNM, INFCIRC/225 Code of Conduct of RAD Sources MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS Conference on Disarmament NUCLEAR TREATIES Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - Technical Cooperation Program Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) - Treaty of Tlatelolco - Treaty of Rarotonga - Bangkok Treaty - Pelindaba Treaty Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) IAEA Safeguards Policy Additional Protocol Implementation U.S. Voluntary Offer (List of Eligible Facilities) Board of Governors TECHNICAL Proliferation Resistant Fuel Cycle Technologies (PRFCT) Safeguards Equipment Development NA-24 ADA Cheri Fitzgerald DADA Cynthia Lersten NA-20 DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION Deputy Administrator - Paul M. Longsworth Jon Phillips Michael Bedke Ron Cherry Zan Hollander Dunbar Lockwood John Murphy Ed Wonder BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL COOPERATION (AEA SECTION 123) Administrative Arrangements Subsequent Arrangements Nuclear Material Management & Safeguards System (NMMSS) NRC Licensing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Workshops Team Leader Vacancy Michael Bedke Aysun Scott Mark Kinglsey CBW/MT Vacancy Sean Oehlbert Tatiana Delorm Judy Gibson Dunbar Lockwood Drew Nickels Carl Thorne Vacancy Melissa Krupa Tatiana Delorm Ed Fox Russ Hibbs Zan Hollander Heather Looney Kim Mamodo Drew Nickels Carl Thorne Arthur Wendel
Nuclear Supply and Transfers : Nuclear Supply and Transfers
Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Security: Areas of Licensing Responsibility : Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Security: Areas of Licensing Responsibility Industry
Part 810 Specific and General Authorizations
Dual-Use License Reviews
Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Missile, and Electronic devices / Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
Munitions License Reviews
Sections 5 and 16: Explosives and Nuclear Weapon Design and Test Equipment
Assurance Requests for NRC Exports
DHS/CBP & ICE & U.S. Coast Guard; FBI; DOC/BIS/EE Support
DOE Complex
Maintain NP Guidelines/Sensitive Subjects/Countries Lists
Provide Guidance on:
Foreign Travel by DOE Funded Scientists and Engineers
Deemed Exports (Foreign Hires)
International Programs (IPP, NCI, MPC&A, etc.)
Surplus Property
ECI Review of DOE Publications
Review Transfer Nuclear Software
Provide NP Seminar Series
Support “Pit-Out” Reviews
Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Security: Non-Licensing Areas of Responsibility : Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Security: Non-Licensing Areas of Responsibility
Multilateral Regime Support
Nuclear Suppliers Group
NPT Exporters Committee (Zangger)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Wassenaar & Australia Group (AG)
Other Issues
Bilaterals
IAEA Code of Conduct for Radioactive Sources
Interdiction (NIAG, President’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Sanctions
NISS (NSG Information Sharing System)
Physical Protection
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
IAEA INFCIRC/225 Updates
Physical Protection Bilateral Consultations
Technical Projects
Economic Globalization
Machine Tools
SNET List Review
Technical Review Group
Commercialization of DOE lab technology (CRADAs)
Stable Isotope Separation
Graphite Controls
Proliferation Research and Analysis (PRAP) Projects
Proliferation Trade Control Directory (PTCD)
Slide7 : Purpose:
Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by:
delaying a nuclear program and allowing other means, such as diplomacy, to help;
causing an end-user to accept a less capable and more costly option; and
allowing for countries to take a principled position on nuclear nonproliferation Nuclear Supply & Transfers: Multilateral Export Controls
Strategies: : Strategies: Strategies Nuclear Supply & Transfers:
Multilateral Export Controls
Mission: : Mission: Nuclear Supply & Transfers: Technical and Nonproliferation Studies
MULTILATERAL SUPPLIER GROUP MEMBERSHIP : MULTILATERAL SUPPLIER GROUP MEMBERSHIP
Nuclear Supply & Transfers: Physical Protection : Nuclear Supply & Transfers: Physical Protection Amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to address new post-9/11 nuclear terrorism concerns
Updating IAEA INFCIRC/225 to address these new nuclear security concerns and threats
Bilateral Physical Protection Consultations and Visits:
to evaluate the application of physical protection measures for exported U.S.-origin materials as outlined in the Atomic Energy Act and Nuclear Nonproliferation Act as export license requirements!
The new structure of NA-243 allows the coordination of these two important elements of nuclear transfer security: export controls and physical protection requirements!
Non-Nuclear Security : Non-Nuclear Security
Non-Nuclear Security : Non-Nuclear Security Since FY03, NA-243 has been reviewing missile and chem-bio export license cases
Participation in missile and chem/bio multilateral regimes: Australia Group, Biological Weapons Convention and MTCR
Non-nuclear interdiction groups: MTAG, Shield
Technical and Nonproliferation Studies
Technical Review Group to identify cross-over items controlled for both nuke & missile reasons
Nuclear Treaties & Agreements : Nuclear Treaties & Agreements
Nuclear Treaties & Agreements : Nuclear Treaties & Agreements Subsequent Arrangements
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Conference on Disarmament
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
Nuclear Material Management & Safeguards System (NMMSS)
DOE’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Seminars
IAEA Technical Cooperation Program
Nuclear Safeguards : Nuclear Safeguards
Nuclear Safeguards : Nuclear Safeguards Safeguards Policy
Safeguards Equipment Development (w/NA-242)
IAEA Board of Governors and IAEA General Conference Support
Additional Protocol implementation
Proliferation Resistant Fuel Cycle Technologies
U.S. Voluntary Offer (List of Eligible Facilities)
Technology Transfer Control : Technology Transfer Control Objectives:
To identify materials, equipment, and technology of proliferation concern
To prevent transfers to proliferants (through foreign national visits and assignments in DOE complex)
To protect against inadvertent transfers (of ECI and proprietary data)
To weigh proliferation and security concerns against value of scholarship, technology advance, and economic benefit
To implement U.S. Government policy on transfers of materials, equipment, and technology
Technology Transfer Control : Technology Transfer Control Mechanisms of Transfer:
Sales, donations, loans, leases, exports
Technical exchanges and communications
Work-for-others, Cooperative Agreements, patent assignments
Publications and presentations
Visits and assignments to DOE sites
Foreign travel by DOE personnel
Technology Transfer Control : Technology Transfer Control Transfer Control Principle:
Whatever the transfer mechanism, export control review is mandatory by U.S. law and regulation
Control Measures:
Export control review of all proposed transfers, exchanges, publications, presentations, visits and assignments, and foreign travel
Export control requirements placed in all transfer agreements
DOE/NNSA approval required for retransfers
Technology Transfer Control : Technology Transfer Control Areas under 30-day export control review by DOE
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) list
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) list
Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological warfare related list
Category 3:
Export control regulations – Departments of Energy, Commerce, and State, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
DOE/NNSA
Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation
Sensitive Countries List
Sensitive Subjects List
Technology experts and export control personne
l
DOE Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation Updated : DOE Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation Updated Separated export control concerns for equipment and technology.
Added more footnotes for technical background.
Sale of equipment in the U.S. is not a deemed export, if sale is open to public. ***
Added more info on Part 810 authorizations.
Added more on exceptions and exemptions.
Updated ECI markings.
Emphasized the NSG, SSL, NTRB are just references, the governing documents are the laws and regulations.
*** Proposed DOC regulation in F.R. (May 27th comment deadline) on “use” would be deemed export if export controlled equipment is “operated”.
Guidelines (continued) : Guidelines (continued) Added a statement about originating organization using discretionary publication control over EAR 99 unclassified information that might be a proliferation concern.
Added a reference to the Federal Property Regulations.
Added a 5-year record retention period for the export or deemed export of ECI.
Added a note that property transfer approval be addressed in the initial funding document.
Added a section on the prerelease of software.
Added Appendix 3 on DOE directives.
General update and editing
Export Controlled Information (ECI) : Export Controlled Information (ECI) Export Controlled Information (ECI) - Technical information whose export requires a license
ECI should be protected if uncontrolled dissemination would adversely affect U.S. national security or nonproliferation objectives
DOE policy on dissemination of ECI must balance commitments to:
U.S. nonproliferation and national security goals
Scientific and technological advance
Benefit to U.S. industry
Benefit to U.S. taxpayer
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements
Export Controlled Information (ECI) : Export Controlled Information (ECI) ECI (continued):
Restricting release of ECI:
Publications:
Edit sensitive data
Limit distribution
Presentations:
Edit sensitive data
Limit audience
Surplus Property : Surplus Property Transfer of Surplus Property:
Equipment and materials must be made useless for nuclear purposes
Transfer agreement must include strict nonproliferation conditions
There is a presumption of destruction for NSG Trigger list items and for weapons components
For items deemed too valuable to destroy:
Request exception from DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
May require modifying equipment to render it useless for nuclear purposes
Must get DOE/NNSA approval for retransfer or export
Slide27 : Dual-Use Export Licensing:
Export Administration Act of 1979 gives Commerce the lead
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implements
Sections of note:
15 CFR Part 738, Special Country Policies
15 CFR Part 742, Control Policy -- CCL Based Controls
15 CFR Part 744, Control Policy -- End-User and End-Use Based Catch-All Controls
15 CFR Part 752, Special Comprehensive Licenses
15 CFR Part 774, Commerce Control List (includes Nuclear Referral List) Industry Export Control
Slide28 : Munitions Licensing:
Under jurisdiction of the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR Part 121
DOE reviews nuclear-related cases
Category V - Explosives, Propellants, Incendiary Agents
Category XVI - Nuclear Weapons Design and Test Equipment
Authority
Arms Export Control Act 1976
Review process similar to dual-use cases, except without time limits or escalation Industry Export Control
Slide29 : NRC Exports:
Nuclear exports requiring special or general licenses
10 CFR Part 110
Authority
Atomic Energy Act of 1954
DOE assists NRC in securing assurances from foreign governments that exports of nuclear materials and equipment will be for peaceful uses
DOE provides general license request confirmations Industry Export Control
Slide30 : Developing a self-assessment program aimed at the DOE Complex. Elements being contemplated are sensitive subject list training, “deemed export” procedure review in Complex and export control classification procedures for high risk property.
Pilot funding has been provided to Sandia, ORNL and SRNL to examine high risk property classification. The self-assessment program is currently being developed by NA-243 with support from ORNL and SRNL. New Export Control Initiatives
Slide31 : To provide an aid to high risk property classification, and other NA-243 projects, a data base is under development, the Proliferation Trade Control Directory (PTCD), that will serve as a reference identifying export controlled equipment, material and components, their available images, U.S. and foreign suppliers, technical specifications, and Export Control Commodity Numbers (ECCNs) and cross - referenced Harmonized Tariff System Numbers. New Export Control Initiatives
Slide32 : AREAS FOR ASSISTANCE Continue to maintain existing and develop new expertise necessary to support NA-243 initiatives
Incorporate export licensing and nonproliferation awareness into security briefings for new personnel
In the interim, ensure that “deemed exports” and ECI applicability review are done for all foreign national visits and assignments and foreign travel by federal and contractor personnel
Target professional societies and groups of industry for nonproliferation awareness training
Actively participate in Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshops and Seminars
Slide33 : NA-243 NEWS Develop introductory export licensing and nonproliferation awareness material for new DOE and DOE contractor personnel to be distributed as part of security briefing
Expand outreach to scientific and technical communities to increase export licensing and nonproliferation awareness
Seek opportunities to promote awareness at professional society conventions and meetings, or through publications
Slide34 : Forward Thinking for Export Licensing New nuclear weapons reduction agreement with Russia will require increased nonproliferation effort
Propose to add a mandatory check-off block to FACTS to ensure that visited offices conduct “deemed exports” applicability review
Propose to add a mandatory check-off block to FTMS to ensure traveling official conduct export control applicability review
Develop an unclassified database of questions and responding guidance from NA-243
Categorize by areas of NA-243 responsibilities
Make accessible through the NA-243 web site
Continuously update database with newly posed questions
The New Age of Export Controls? Recent developments influencing export controls : The New Age of Export Controls? Recent developments influencing export controls
The President’s Initiatives : The President’s Initiatives President Bush’s February 11 WMD speech at the National Defense University outlined a number of new initiatives, including initiatives related to export controls, to help mend the gaps in the nonproliferation regime which allow proliferators to acquire WMD-significant items and technologies
The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the G-8 are now working to adopt these measures
New NSG Initiatives : New NSG Initiatives In his speech, the President specifically called on the NSG to implement some of these measures, including:
Establishing the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply by ‘05
Banning transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies
Suspending nuclear trade to states found in noncompliance with IAEA safeguards obligations
These issues are now being deliberated within the NSG
UNSCR 1540 : UNSCR 1540 Another positive step for export controls was the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which obligates all countries to:
Refrain from providing support in acquiring, manufacturing, transferring or using WMD
Adopt and enforce adequate export controls
Adopt and enforce transit, transshipment and retransfer controls
Work with their industries and public to inform them of these obligations
Radioactive Source Export Controls : Radioactive Source Export Controls The 2003 IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources calls for import and export controls on a subset of radioactive sources which could be used in a “dirty bomb”
Over 40 countries developed import/export Guidance to support this objective
This import/export Guidance calls for end-use and end-user evaluations, notifications of shipments, and recipient authorization
The USG is currently developing regulations to uphold these import/export provisions, to go into effect January 1, 2006
The New Frontier of Export Controls : The New Frontier of Export Controls Recent revelations such as the A. Q. Khan illicit procurement network demonstrate the need for strengthened export controls
The President’s Initiatives and the passage of UNSC Resolution 1540 emphasize the importance of export controls as a nonproliferation tool
PSI and other interdiction efforts are reinforcing export control efforts by interdicting illegally-transferred and/or illicitly-procured items
What next for export controls?
THE END : THE END