ROK Security Perceptions SangHyunLee

Changes from Within:Changing Security Perception in South Korea and Its Implications for ROK Security Policy: 

Changes from Within: Changing Security Perception in South Korea and Its Implications for ROK Security Policy November 1, 2006 Sang-Hyun Lee The Sejong Institute, KOREA shlee@sejong.org

South Korea’s Key National Interests : 

South Korea’s Key National Interests Guarantee national security Deter North Korean aggression, defeat if attacked Maintain military alliance Arms control on the Korean peninsula Robust economic development and prosperity Economic development Access to world market Development of liberal democray Transition to liberal democracy Legal justice and civil rights National self-esteem and contribution to international peace Image of peace-loving nation Peaceful reunification Peaceful and step-by-step reunification

Traditional Security Concept: 

Traditional Security Concept Security 101 - Deter North Korean invasion Legacy of Korean War - war and subsequent division Inter-Korean relations as a ‘legitimacy war’ Both claimed to be the sole legitimate regime on the Korean Peninsula Basis of regime legitimacy – performance and ideology Diverging ideologies Democracy vs. nationalism South adopted US-style democratic political system North – based on Kim Il Sung’ Soviet affiliation, experience in underground nationalist movement State capitalism v. ‘Juche’

Inter-Korean Relations After the War: 

Inter-Korean Relations After the War Armistice, not the end of the Korean War Military Armistice Commission (MAC) –Administer military ceasefire – perpetuate military stalemate, not to resolve the conflict’s underlying causes Series of high level North-South dialogues commenced in 1990s Containment and deterrence Dominated much of the inter-Korean relations until the 1990s Korea-US alliance system was designed to deter North’s aggression Dialogues and conflicts July 4, 1972 – first North-South Joint Communique 1974 – Moon Se-kwang’s attempt to assassinate president Park 1983 – Rangoon, Burma - explosion during Chun’s state visit to Burma From containment to engagement Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik 1991 – both Koreas admitted to the United Nations

Korea, North and South: 

Korea, North and South

Comparison of GNI (’90~’04): 

Comparison of GNI (’90~’04)

Security Perception Change: 

Security Perception Change The End of the Cold War President Roh Tae-woo’s ‘Northern Policy’ – diplomatic normalization with Russia and China ‘Basic Agreement’ for non-aggression, reconciliation, and cooperation (1992) Changes in Inter-Korean Relations Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il’s June 2000 summmit and Joint Communique (2000) Joint Declaration of Denuclearlizaion of the Korean Peninsula (1992) Changing perception for ROK-US Alliance From Client-patron relations to more equal partnership

Turn Toward Engagement: 

Turn Toward Engagement Late ’80s and ’90s End of the Cold War Nordpolitik – from Chun Do Hwan (1980~1988), Roh Tae-woo (1988~1993) to Kim Young Sam (1993~1998) Taepo-Dong launch, 1998 Food shortage – as many as 3 million dead between August 1995 and Jaunary 1998 Changing Concepts on North Korea ‘Main enemy’, but still the same ‘nation’ Chung Ju Young - ‘cattle diplomacy’ and Kumkangsan tourism paved the way South Korean civil society began to look at Northern brethren – NGOs, civil activists, and religious organizations voiced for engagement

Sunshine Policy: 

Sunshine Policy Objectives of Sunshine Policy 'Improve inter-Korean relations by promoting peace, reconciliation, and cooperation' Three principles No armed provocations will be tolerated No takeover or absorption of North Korea by the South Expansion of reconciliation and cooperation Kim Dae-jung government’s feature (1998~2003) A minority reformist regime Conservative oppositions External environment – US suspicion

Changing Perception on ROK-US Alliance: 

Changing Perception on ROK-US Alliance Korea’s domestic changes Growing awareness of the Korean ‘nationhood’ No more unilateral support from the United States National pride for economic achievements along with remarkable democratization Generational change - the younger generations have much more positive attitudes toward North Korea Changes in US perception After the September 11, heavy emphasis on anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation Less inclined to tolerate anti-American sentiments abroad

New Political Landscapes in Korea: 

New Political Landscapes in Korea Political Parties Progressives Uri Party KDLP (Korean Democratic Labor Party) Conservatives – GNP, PFP Civic Movement Organizations (CMOs) Empowered by democratic transition in the ’80s Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (1989) Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (1993) People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (1994) Labor Unions Korean Teachers and Education Workers’ Union (전교조) Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (민노총) Federation of Korean Trade Unions (한노총)

Perceptions on Korea-US Alliance: 

Perceptions on Korea-US Alliance Global Views 2004 (EAI, CCFR Joint Survey, 2005)

Perception on USFK by Generations: 

Perception on USFK by Generations

Evaluation of Korea-US Relations since Roh Moo-hyun Took Power: 

Evaluation of Korea-US Relations since Roh Moo-hyun Took Power

Attitudes for Transfer of Wartime OPCON: 

Attitudes for Transfer of Wartime OPCON

Perceptions on USFK Reduction: 

Perceptions on USFK Reduction Security impact of USFK reduction Positive Negative Oppose USFK stationing Support USFK stationing Traditional Anti-American Group N=389 39% Accepting US Military Transformation Group N=214 21% Emotional Anti-American Group N=100 10% Traditional Pro-alliance Group N=297 30%

How President Roh Moo-hyun is Doing: 

How President Roh Moo-hyun is Doing

How Political Parties are Doing: 

How Political Parties are Doing

After a Nuclear Test: 

After a Nuclear Test Hankook Ilbo, Media Research (Sept. 2006)

Perception for Engagement Policy: 

Perception for Engagement Policy

Implications for Korea’s Security Policy: 

Implications for Korea’s Security Policy Domestic politics Uri Party – currently holds 47% of National Assembly, considers dissolving and recreating the party Bleak promise of re-election from Roh’s party Engagement Policies: Can it continue? After a nuclear test – can it be the same? More reciprocity and monitoring Transformation of ROK-US alliance From military alliance to comprehensive security partnership Transfer of wartime OPCON – dissolution of the CFC – more independent and equal, but how much efficient?