Presentation Transcript
Computer securityco-operation in Europe : Computer security co-operation in Europe
Jan Meijer, SURFnet-CERT
jan.meijer@surfnet.nl
Based on materials provided by TERENA TF-CSIRT
Agenda : Agenda Why co-operate?
History of co-operation
CSIRT Task Force (TF-CSIRT)
Benefits:
Contacts
Trends and hot issues
Deliverables, including:
IRT database object
Common format on incident data
Training course for new CSIRTs
Accreditation scheme for new teams
Questions
Why Co-operate? : Why Co-operate? Security incidents are international
Must work together to solve them
No team knows everything
Share knowledge, resources, tools
Compare working practices
Develop best practice & standards
Provide better and faster service
Historical perspective : Historical perspective Pre-1990: CSIRTs in isolation (if at all)
During 1990s: FIRST provides binding:
Members meet members
Basic notion of trust
Exchange of operational information
Less powerful in initiating innovation
Mid 1990s: EuroCERT pilot service:
Top-down approach
Operational work outsourced to 3rd party
2000: TF-CSIRT established
Influence of NRENs : Influence of NRENs National Research & Education Networks
Traditionally innovative
Low commercial profile
Natural “academic” way of working
Achievements based on collaboration
Results shared for society’s benefit
Free dissemination of expertise
1994: TERENA (see: www.terena.nl)
Creation of TF-CSIRT : Creation of TF-CSIRT TERENA Task Force:
Operation defined by Terms of Reference
Two years recurring lifecycle with review
Members and non-members of TERENA
No membership fee, just travel & hotel costs
Active participation by members
Success depends on members’ commitment
TERENA plays role of professional facilitator:
Secretarial tasks
Logistical support
TF-CSIRT way of working : TF-CSIRT way of working Meeting every four months
Venue rotates among members who volunteer to host
Two days:
1st day for seminars and presentations
2nd day for Task Force official meeting
Evening in-between: social event organised by the hosting member
Contacts between meetings provided by mailing list and project groups
Who is involved? : Who is involved? Academic, Government, Commercial teams
28 countries
Benefits - contacts : Benefits - contacts Operational people talk directly to each other
Trusted contacts for later work
Little or no formalities, collaborative atmosphere
Ad-hoc subgroups working on concrete deliverables
Social event often proves to be a fruitful environment for new ideas
Benefits – trends and hot issues : Benefits – trends and hot issues Supportive peer review of other members’ organisation and operations
Members share and consume expertise (a win/win approach)
Atmosphere of understanding – no team has to fight common problems alone
Discussing trends and hot issues among peers make these trends and hot issues easier to understand and assess
Wider Co-operation : Wider Co-operation European Commission
Projects (eCSIRT.net, EISPP, TRANSITS)
Legal handbook for CSIRTs
Network & Information Security Agency
National governments
Government CSIRTs
Consultation on new legislation
Law enforcement
Operations and invited speakers at meetings
Other regional initiatives
Deliverables and Projects : Deliverables and Projects Trusted Introducer Service & Directory
Incident Object Description & Exchange Format
RIPE IRT object
Clearing House for Incident Handling Tools
CSIRT training course (TRANSITS) Under development
Incident Information Exchange (eCSIRT.net)
Vulnerability information exchange (EISPP)
Assistance to new CSIRTs
Incident Handling Procedures
Deliverables – Trusted Introducer (http://www.ti.terena.nl/) : Deliverables – Trusted Introducer (http://www.ti.terena.nl/) Notion of ‘trust’ – is a contact trustworthy?
Currently, no scheme generically applicable
TF-CSIRT to work out a model of which it believes it fulfills criteria needed at operational level
Feasibility and sanity checks
Now, outsourced to a 3rd party
TF-CSIRT retains control by TI Review Board
Deliverables – IODEF(http://www.iodef.org/) : Deliverables – IODEF (http://www.iodef.org/) Incident Object Description & Exchange Format
Cross-platform, cross-language, cross common understanding
Need for a well-understood definition of an incident
Bottom-up working group
Lots of output, among which RFC 3067
Now transferred to IETF (INCH)
Deliverables – IRT database object : Deliverables – IRT database object Commonly perceived problem: correct points of contact in (RIPE) database
Practical approach:
what do we miss now?
how can we design it
how can we implement it?
Wishlist followed by discussion in RIPE database group
Lots of iterations, but eventually implemented and populated
Deliverables – CHIHT(http://chiht.dfn-cert.de/) : Deliverables – CHIHT (http://chiht.dfn-cert.de/) Clearing House for Incident Handling Tools
Share information on tools CSIRTs use
Help new and existing teams
Website listing tools by category
Evidence gathering & investigation, system recovery, CSIRT operations, remote access, proactive tools
Plan to add procedures and best practice
Contents suggested by active CSIRTs
Deliverables – TRANSITS(http://www.ist-transits.org/) : Deliverables – TRANSITS (http://www.ist-transits.org/) Teams were seeking relevant training
Idea: best transfer of knowledge is from operational people to operational people
Conclusion: best people to write it are TF-CSIRT members
Two day course developed in modules:
Operational, legal, technical, organisational, vulnerabilities
EC funding for delivery and updating
Six presentations over three years
Materials available to members for own use
Deliverables – eCSIRT.net (http://www.ecsirt.net/) : Deliverables – eCSIRT.net (http://www.ecsirt.net/) Teams need to exchange incidents
To resolve them
To measure statistics and trends
To get early warnings
Need processes and standards
Language (using IDMEF & IODEF)
Meanings (definitions, trust & procedure)
Automation (to identify events and trends)
Develop/test these among trusted teams
Build larger network using tested processes
Deliverables – EISPP(http://www.eispp.org/) : Deliverables – EISPP (http://www.eispp.org/) Need technical skills to do security
How can small businesses cope?
Current advisories not suitable for them
Additional preventive services needed
Need to define services
And develop funding models
Service providers need to co-operate
Develop processes and technology
Questions? : Questions?
Catch the
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