conf Briser les mythes du terrorisme

Global Salafi Terrorist Networks: 

Global Salafi Terrorist Networks Marc Sageman sageman@post.harvard.edu

Evidence Based Terrorism Research: 

Evidence Based Terrorism Research Specific threat to the U.S. Application of scientific method to terrorism research Started with 9/11 Perpetrators as index sample 400 biographies of terrorists: Open Source information Trial transcripts US, France, Germany, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Canada Press accounts (FBIS) English, French, German, Arabic, Spanish, Turkish, Dutch Academic publications Internet (corroborated)

Global Salafi Jihad: 

Global Salafi Jihad Violent Islamist born-again social movement Idealistic young people seeking glory by trying to build a better world View themselves as heroes fighting for justice & fairness Crisis of values: Salafi virtue v. Western decadence & greed Utopia modeled on community of the Prophet & his companions (Salaf) Four phases: Peaceful capture of the state (al-Banna – Muslim Brothers) Against the near enemy (Faraj – “the forgotten duty”) Global expansion of defensive jihad (Azzam) Global offense against the far enemy (Zawahiri & bin Laden) Expel the West from the Middle East Use of violence against non-Muslim governments or population to establish an Islamist state

Evolution of al Qaeda: 

Evolution of al Qaeda Three processes of self-selection of the most militants: 1988-9: the most militants, who had come to fight the anti-Soviet jihad & could not go home, stayed behind and formed al Qaeda 1991-2: the most militants expelled from Pakistan went to Sudan Switch of strategy from “near enemy” to “far enemy” 1996: 150 militants expelled from Sudan returned to Afghanistan 1996-2001: Golden age of al Qaeda: Control of “Golden Chain:” exclusive funding for terrorism Control of training camps & provision of shelter Staff for planning & coordination Afghanistan, as failed state, has little ability to control al Qaeda Al Qaeda controlled social movement & focused it on “far enemy”

Poverty?: Family of origin (SES): 

Poverty?: Family of origin (SES)

Islam?: Devotion as youth: 

Islam?: Devotion as youth

Madrassa?: Educational background: 

Madrassa?: Educational background

Naïve teenagers?: Age at joining: 

Naïve teenagers?: Age at joining Average Age: 25.69

Ignorance?: Levels of education: 

Ignorance?: Levels of education

Religious?: Type of education: 

Religious?: Type of education

Lack of opportunity?: Occupation: 

Lack of opportunity?: Occupation

No sex?: Marital status: 

No sex?: Marital status

No responsibility?: Family status: 

No responsibility?: Family status

Just bad?: Criminal background: 

Just bad?: Criminal background

Criminal Background: 

Criminal Background Vast Majority: no crime Some major crime Robbery (Roubaix gang, Kelkal gang, JI) Drugs (Madrid, Strasbourg) Petty crime: Maghreb logistic cells Credit card fraud, false documents, insurance fraud Drug traffic (more common now) ASPD eliminated Those least likely to do harm individually are most able to do so collectively.

Simply mad?: Mental health: 

Simply mad?: Mental health Very little evidence of mental illness Very little evidence of personality disorder No narcissism (willingness to sacrifice for the comrade & cause) No pathological hatred Very little trauma in family studied: usually overprotected youths Overall, “good kids,” except second generation Maghreb Arabs, who lived life of petty crime

Place where they joined jihad: 

Place where they joined jihad

Diaspora: 

Diaspora Global Salafi Jihad is a Diaspora phenomenon Expatriate + Second/Third Generation 84% of Global Salafi Mujahedin have joined the jihad, while living in a Diaspora (87% in Western Europe) Link between terrorism & Diaspora predated “globalization” & not specific to religion or Islam Anarchists, IRA, LTTE, ETA

Joining the Jihad: 

Joining the Jihad Friendship (pre-existing): 68% “Bunch of guys” collectively deciding to join Joining childhood friends Kinship: 20% Fathers, brothers, first cousins Importance of in-laws & marriage to cement friendship bonds Discipleship: 10% Students of Sungkar & Baasyir from Jamaah Islamiyah

Trajectory of Muslim expatriates: 

Trajectory of Muslim expatriates Upwardly & geographically mobile (“best & brightest”) Mostly from religious, caring & middle class families Global citizens, conversant in 3 or 4 languages, skilled in computer technology Separated from traditional bonds & culture Homesick, lonely, marginalized & excluded from society Adopt Western lifestyle, without relief Seek friends Drifted to mosques for companionship, not religion Moved in together (halal food), formed cliques

Trajectory of 2nd generation immigrants: 

Trajectory of 2nd generation immigrants Two main paths Second generation in the West Young economic immigrants to the West Upwardly mobile, & completely secular background Discriminated by & excluded from society Drop out of school Turn to petty crime & drugs Resentful & reactive activation of collective identity Groups of friends, who grew up together & collectively drifted to religion to escape their situation Radicalized collectively Personal experience resonate with Salafi ideology

Mobilization: 

Mobilization Spontaneously self-organized “bunches of guys” of trusted friends, from the bottom up No top down Al Qaeda recruitment program No campaign, shura or budget dedicated to recruitment Selection: 15% of volunteers accepted No evidence of “brainwashing”: they simply acquired the beliefs of their friends No evidence of “recruiter”: total proselytizing environment  they all mutually recruited each other Social bonds came before ideological commitment Group processes: no Robinson Crusoe narrative

Motivation : 

Motivation Insidious process: Low risk participation with an increasingly closer set of friends Medium risk proselytism for an ideal way of life Importance of specific script for the global Salafi jihad: 12 Islamist institutions generated 50% of sample Salafi ideology: new values (Islam & ummah) Faith & commitment grounded in intense small group dynamics Gradual development of a collective identity “Born again:” imitate jihadi heroic pathway Complete transformation of values

In-group love: 

In-group love Dynamics of dense social networks promotes in-group love Self-sacrifice for comrades and the cause Secular  religious Material  spiritual Worldly gains  otherworldly rewards Short-term opportunity  long-term vision Individual concern  communitarian sacrifice Transcend apathy  active engagement Traditional morality  takfir group morality

Out-group hate: 

Out-group hate Grounded in everyday experience of discrimination & exclusion from highest levels of society Endemic in Middle East & Western Europe Grounded in group dynamics: “Bunch of guys” escalation of mutual complaints about the unfairness & injustice in society Endorse conspiracy theories Endorse takfir doctrine  sanctions commission of crimes v. society

Group Dynamics: 

Group Dynamics Explanation in normal group dynamics, rather than individual mental pathology Group acts as interactive “echo chamber,” which encourages escalation, overcoming inertia & fatalism Once in the movement, difficult to abandon it without betraying close friends & family This natural & intense loyalty to the group, inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists High risk terrorist operations In-group love + out-group hate (under specific violent script, often religious)  mass murder + suicide

The Network: 

The Network

Pre-existing social bonds: 

Pre-existing social bonds

Operational Links: 

Operational Links Bali, 2002 Jakarta, 2003 Singapore Plot, 2001 Strasbourg, 1999 France, 1995 LAX,. 1999 Casablanca, 2003 Morocco, 1994 Istanbul, 2003 9/11/01 Emb, 1998

Personal v Operational Links: 

Personal v Operational Links

Radicalization: 

Radicalization Idealistic young people, chasing a dream Bottom up process of informal group radicalization Sense of moral outrage, activating Muslim collective identity Major moral violation (killings, arrests): anger, not humiliation Viewing horrors (Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Iraq) Interpreted through specific ideology Perceptions (“frames”) are crucial intervening variables Crisis of values (Western decadence v. Islam) War on Islam Resonates with personal experience Local grievances (discrimination) given a more universal meaning Mobilized through networks (face to face & virtual group dynamics) Gangs, radical student associations, radical religious study groups Radical chatrooms

Continued Evolution: 

Continued Evolution Success of Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism campaign Elimination of sanctuary, funding, communication & key leaders Increased worldwide vigilance Neutralization of al Qaeda proper Physical break up of formal global Salafi jihad networks Same dynamics (self organized groups) but no more linkage Homegrown phenomenon Lack of strategic leadership & restraints (more aggressive & reckless) Local autonomy, self-financing & self-training Informal communications, difficult to monitor Fuzzy boundaries: no formal initiation or fixed numbers Change in the nature of the threat: <2002: exogenous; >2002: endogenous Western policy increased pool of potential terrorists

Myths about Terrorist Operations: 

Myths about Terrorist Operations Engineering (General Staff) Paradigm: Ideology  strategy  tactics Decision  plan (target analysis)  execution “Al Qaeda is patient, plans for years, and is meticulous about details.” Image is astute strategist, backed up by general staff, which carefully crafts battle plans with detailed target analysis to defeat the West.

Madrid Bombings: 

Madrid Bombings

Toward a Global “Leaderless” Jihad: 

Toward a Global “Leaderless” Jihad Decentralized, loosely connected network Mobilized and motivated autonomously No more 9/11, but lots of 3/11 or 7/7, especially in Europe Threat to the West comes from the West Military role (no hard targets) sanctuary denial in potential failed or friendly states Importance of the Internet Virtual “Invisible hand” organizing terrorist operations: C2 Social transformation of the jihad Enemy Center of Gravity: Vision of Salafi utopia unites the leaderless jihad Ideological battleground (War of Ideas)

Identifying the networks: Triangulation: 

Identifying the networks: Triangulation Background attributes Diaspora Young: 15-30 (mostly men, but women becoming more common) Underemployed, spending lots of time on Internet Travel abroad (or new passport) Syria, Pakistan, Iran, Yemen, Turkey, Egypt Behavioral attributes Salafi Dramatic change: embrace new community, isolated from old community Looks: short pants, beard, mark on forehead (veiled wife) Proselytism: people around them, mosque Takfir: dispute with imam & crime (white collar & drugs) Action predisposition Martial activity: paintball, shooting practice, camping (no training camp) Online attributes Jihadi chat-rooms, jihadi websites Suspicious behaviors Interest in terrorist activities (downloading info); ideas or plans about terrorist activities; communicating inappropriate interest in target; casing target; getting means of destruction Revert back to non-salafi appearance & preparation: marriage, settle debts