patterns

Patterns of Conflict : Patterns of Conflict John R. Boyd Edited by Chet Richards and Chuck Spinney Produced and designed by Ginger Richards For information on this edition, please see the last page. January 2007 152


Outline : Outline Point of departure Historical snapshots Categories of conflict Synthesis Application Wrap-up Epilogue Sources 1


Focus and direction : Focus and direction Mission To make manifest the nature of moral-mental-physical conflict To discern a pattern for successful operations To help generalize tactics and strategy To find a basis for grand strategy Intent To unveil the character of conflict, survival, and conquest 2


Point of departure : Point of departure Air-to-air 3


Generalization : Generalization Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more quickly while outturning an adversary. In other words, suggests a fighter that can pick and choose engagement opportunities—yet has fast transient ('buttonhook') characteristics that can be used to either force an overshoot by an attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender. 4


Idea expansion : Idea expansion Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or, better yet, get inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or loop. Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries—since our adversaries will be unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are competing against. 5


Examples : Examples Blitzkrieg vs. Maginot Line mentality (1940) F-86 vs. MiG-15 (1951-53) Israeli raid (1976) 6


New conception : New conception Action Exploit operations and weapons that: Generate a rapidly changing environment (quick/clear observations, orientation and decisions, fast-tempo, fast transient maneuvers, quick kill) Inhibit an adversary’s capacity to adapt to such an environment (cloud or distort his observations, orientation, and decisions and impede his actions) Idea Simultaneously compress own time and stretch-out adversary time to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to change Goal Collapse adversary’s system into confusion and disorder causing him to over and under react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading. 7


A-to-A and A-to-GRecipe for generating confusion and disorder : A-to-A and A-to-G Recipe for generating confusion and disorder Observations Quick/clear scanning sensors Suppressed/distorted signatures Activity Fire Quick shoot fire control systems and high speed weapons Movement High speed (supercruise) Rapid energy gain and rapid energy loss coupled with high turn rates and low turn radii High pitch rates/high roll rates/high yaw rates coupled with ease of control 8


Historical snapshots : Historical snapshots 9


Human nature : Human nature Goal Survive, survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for independent action. The competition for limited resources to satisfy these desires may force one to: Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, or deny him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it impossible for him to survive at all. Implication Life is conflict, survival, and conquest. 10


Comment : In addressing any questions about conflict, survival, and conquest one is naturally led to the since both treat conflict, survival, and conquest in a very fundamental way. In this regard, many sources (a few on natural selection and many on war) are reviewed; many points of view are exposed. Comment 11 Theory of evolution by natural selection and the conduct of war


Impression : Impression In examining these many points of view one is bombarded with the notion that: It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be applied rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action. The simpler organisms—those that make-up man as well as man working with other men in a higher level context—must cooperate or, better yet, harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive as an organic synthesis. To shape and adapt to change one cannot be passive; instead one must take the initiative. Put more simply and directly: the above comments leave one with the impression that variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative (and their interaction) seem to be key qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing environment. With this impression in mind together with our notion of getting inside an adversary’s O-O-D-A loop we will proceed in our historical investigation. 12


Historical patternSun Tzu The Art of War c. 400 B.C. : Historical pattern Sun Tzu The Art of War c. 400 B.C. Theme Harmony and trust Justice and well being Inscrutability and enigma Deception and subversion Rapidity and fluidity Dispersion and concentration Surprise and shock Strategy Probe enemy’s organization and dispositions to unmask his strengths, weaknesses, patterns of movement and intentions. 'Shape' enemy’s perception of world to manipulate his plans and actions. Attack enemy’s plans as best policy. Next best disrupt his alliances. Next best attack his army. Attack cities only when there is no alternative. Employ cheng and ch'i maneuvers to quickly and unexpectedly hurl strength against weaknesses. Desired outcome Subdue enemy without fighting Avoid protracted war 13


Historical pattern : Historical pattern Early commanders Alexander Hannibal Belisarius Jenghis Khan Tamerlane Impression Early commanders seem consistent with ideas of Sun Tzu Western commanders more directly concerned with winning the battle Eastern commanders closer to Sun Tzu in attempting to shatter adversary prior to battle * Cheng/ch'i maneuver schemes were employed by early commanders to expose adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses (a la cheng) for exploitation and decisive stroke (via ch'i). 14 Action Cheng and ch'i*


Historical pattern : Historical pattern Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and our comments about early commanders, let’s take a look at an early tactical theme and some battle (grand tactical) situations to gain a feel for the different ways that the cheng/ch'i game has been (and can be) played. 15


Historical pattern : Historical pattern Tactical theme (from about 300 B.C. to 1400 A.D.) Light troops (equipped with bows, javelins, light swords, etc.) perform reconnaissance, screening, and swirling hit-and-run actions to: Unmask enemy dispositions and activities. Cloud/distort own dispositions and activities. Confuse, disorder enemy operations. Heavy troops (equipped with lances, bows, swords, etc.) protected by armor and shields: Charge and smash thinned-out/scattered or disordered/bunched-up enemy formations generated by interaction with light troops; or Menace enemy formations to hold them in tight, or rigid, arrays thereby make them vulnerable to missiles of swirling light troops. Light and heavy troops in appropriate combination pursue, envelop, and mop-up isolated remnants of enemy host. Idea Employ maneuver action by light troops with thrust action of heavy troops to confuse, break-up, and smash enemy formations. 16


Battle of Marathon September 12, 490 B.C. : Battle of Marathon September 12, 490 B.C. Persian Fleet Greeks Persian Army 17


Battle of Leuctra~July 6, 371 B.C. : Battle of Leuctra ~July 6, 371 B.C. Thebans Spartans 18


V. YE. Savkin – The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics – (1972) pages 7 and 203 : V. YE. Savkin – The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics – (1972) pages 7 and 203 Battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.) At this battle Frederick Engels (according to Savkin) credited Epaminondas for having first discovered and employed an unequal or uneven distribution of forces across a front as basis to concentrate forces for the main attack at the decisive point. 19


Battle of Arbela*October 1, 331 B.C. : Battle of Arbela* October 1, 331 B.C. Parmenio Reserve Line Chariots Alexander Companions Darius Mazeus Bessus *Also known as the Battle of Gaugamela 20


Battle of Arbela (Phase II) : Battle of Arbela (Phase II) Parmenio Reserve Line Alexander Companions Darius Mazeus Bessus Persians Flee Persians Flee 21


Battle of CannaeAugust 3, 216 B.C. : Battle of Cannae August 3, 216 B.C. Romans Hannibal Afidus River Opening Phase 22


Battle of Cannae : Battle of Cannae Romans Hannibal Afidus River Final Phase 23


Impression : Impression Battles of Marathon, Leuctra, Arbela, and Cannae emphasize an unequal distribution as basis for local superiority and decisive leverage to collapse adversary resistance. on the other hand The discussion (so far) provides little insight on how these battle arrangements and follow-on maneuvers play upon moral factors such as doubt, fear, anxiety, etc. 24


Historical patternChingis Khan and the Mongols : Historical pattern Chingis Khan and the Mongols Key asymmetries Superior mobility Superior communications Superior intelligence Superior leadership Theme Widely separated strategic maneuvers, with appropriate stratagems, baited retreats, hard-hitting tactical thrusts, and swirling envelopments to uncover and exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses. in conjunction with Clever and calculated use of propaganda and terror to play upon adversary’s doubts, fears, and superstitions in order to undermine his resolve and destroy his will to resist. Aim Conquest, as basis to create, preserve, and expand Mongol nation 25


Mongol strategic maneuver (1219-1220) : Mongol strategic maneuver (1219-1220) Kizyl-Kum Khawarizm State Bokhara Samarkand Caspian Sea Aral Sea Genghis Khan Chagatai Jochi Jebe 500 miles Oxus River (Modern Uzbekistan) 26


? Raises nagging question ? : ? Raises nagging question ? Even though outnumbered, why were Mongols able to maneuver in widely scattered arrays without being defeated separately or in detail? 27


Historical patternsChingis Khan and the Mongols : Historical patterns Chingis Khan and the Mongols Message By exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and mobility as well as by playing upon adversary’s fears and doubts via propaganda and terror, Mongols operated inside adversary observation-orientation-decision-action loops. Result Outnumbered Mongols created impressions of terrifying strength—by seeming to come out of nowhere yet be everywhere. hence, Subversive propaganda, clever stratagems, fast breaking maneuvers, and calculated terror not only created vulnerabilities and weaknesses but also played upon moral factors that drain-away resolve, produce panic, and bring about collapse. 28


Battle of LeuthenDecember 5, 1757 : Battle of Leuthen December 5, 1757 Leuthen Borna Frederick Advance Guard Scheuberg Hill Reserve Austrians Breslau 29


Historical pattern : Historical pattern 18th century theoreticians Saxe Bourcet Guibert Du Teil Theme Plan with several branches Mobility/fluidity of force Cohesion Dispersion and concentration Operate on a line to threaten alternative objectives Concentrate direct artillery fire on key points to be forced 30 Action Napoleon was deeply influenced by the ideas of the above men. In early campaigns (as a general) he applied these ideas of ambiguity, deception, and rapid/easy movement to surprise and successively defeat fractions of superior forces. In later campaigns (as emperor) he relied increasingly on massed direct artillery fire, dense infantry columns, and heavy cavalry going against regions of strong, resistance—at an eventually crippling cost in casualties. American colonists, Spanish and Russian Guerrillas, in unexpected ways, used environmental background (terrain, weather, darkness, etc.) and mobility/fluidity as basis for dispersion and concentration to harass, confuse, and contribute toward the defeat of the British and French under Napoleon.


Historical pattern : Historical pattern 18th century theoreticians Saxe Bourcet Guibert Du Teil Theme Plan with several branches Mobility/fluidity of force Cohesion Dispersion and concentration Operate on a line to threaten alternative objectives Concentrate direct artillery fire on key points to be forced 31 Action Napoleon was deeply influenced by the ideas of the above men. In early campaigns (as a general) he exploited these ideas of variety and rapidity with harmony for ambiguity, deception, and rapid/easy movement in order to surprise and successively defeat fractions of superior forces. In later campaigns (as emperor) he exchanged variety and harmony for rigid uniformity via massed direct artillery fire, dense infantry columns, and heavy cavalry going against regions of strong resistance—that resulted in an ever higher and crippling cost in casualties. American colonists, Spanish and Russian guerrillas exploited variety and rapidity associated with environmental background (terrain, weather, darkness, etc.) and mobility/fluidity of small bands with harmony of common cause against tyranny/injustice as basis to harass, confuse, and contribute toward the defeat of the British and French under Napoleon.


Impression : Impression The ideas of Sun Tzu, Saxe, Bourcet, and Guibert seem to be at home with either regular or guerrilla warfare. 32


Historical patternNapoleon’s art of war : Historical pattern Napoleon’s art of war Revolutionary army gifts to Napoleon Moral and physical energy of citizen-soldiers and new leaders generated by the revolution and magnified by successes against invading allied armies Subdivision of army into smaller self-contained but mutually supporting units (divisions) Ability to travel light and live-off countryside without extensive baggage, many supply wagons, and slow-moving resupply efforts Rapid march associated with '120' instead of the standard '70' steps per minute Discontinued adherence to 1791 Drill Regulations pertaining to the well regulated and stereotype use of column and line formations for movement and fighting Beneficial asymmetry Mobility/fluidity of force dramatically better than that possessed by potential adversaries. ? Raises question ? How did Napoleon exploit this superior mobility/fluidity of force? 33


Historical patternNapoleon’s art of war : Historical pattern Napoleon’s art of war General features Plan and resolution: Evolve plan with appropriate variations each of which correspond to probable or possible actions. Employ Intelligence/recce units (spies, agents, cavalry, etc.) in predetermined directions to eliminate or confirm hypotheses concerning enemy actions thereby reduce uncertainty and simplify own plans as well as uncover adversary plans and intentions. Security: Generate misinformation, devise stratagems, and alter composition of major formations to confuse and baffle enemy agents, spies, etc. Employ screens of cavalry, infantry, or both and make rise of natural features such as terrain, weather, and darkness to mask dispositions and cloak movements against enemy observation. Strategic dispersion and tactical concentration: Expand then contract intervals between force components in an irregular and rapid fashion to cloud/distort strategic penetration maneuvers yet quickly focus tactical effort for a convergent blow at the decisive point. Vigorous offensive action: Seize initiative at the outset by attacking enemy with an ever-shifting kaleidoscope of (strategic) moves and diversions in order to upset his actions and unsettle his plans thereby psychologically unbalance him and keep initiative throughout. Strategic theme Use unified (or single) line of operations as basis for mutual support between separated adjacent and follow-on units. Menace (and try to seize) adversary communications to isolate his forces from outside support or reinforcement and force him to fight under unfavorable circumstances by the following actions: Employ fraction of force to hold or divert adversary attention—by feints, demonstrations, pinning maneuvers, etc. Exploit 'exterior maneuvers' against exposed flanks or 'interior maneuvers' thru a weak front to place (bulk of) forces in adversary’s flank and rear. Set-up supporting 'centers (bases) of operation' and alternative lines of communication and keep (at least some) safe and open as basis to maintain freedom of maneuver. Aim Destroy enemy army 34


Strategy of envelopment(idealized schematic) : 35 Strategy of envelopment (idealized schematic) corps of observation curtain of maneuver strategic barrier line of defense Cheng pinning force ch'i maneuver force LOCs curtain of maneuver strategic barrier line of defense pinning force secondary attack main attack corps of observation I. The Envelopment March II. The Reversed Front Battle cavalry screen corps of observation cavalry screen Source: David G. Chandler, Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980.


The strategy of central position (idealized schematic) : base base N xxxx LOC LOC I. Advance to Contact cavalry screen The strategy of central position (idealized schematic) 36 Source: David G. Chandler, Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980.


Historical patternNapoleon’s art of war : Historical pattern Napoleon’s art of war Early tactics 'The action was opened by a cloud of sharpshooters, some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his cannon by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they also received considerable reinforcement to increase their over-all effect … Once the chink in foe’s armour had been revealed … the horse artillery would gallop up and open fire with canister at close range. The attacking force would meantime be moving up in the indicated direction, the infantry advancing in column, the cavalry in regiments or squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy bullets or cannon balls began to slacken … The soldiers would begin to run forward, those in the front ranks crossing their bayonets, as the drums beat the charge; the sky would ring a thousand battle-cries constantly repeated: 'En avant. En avant. Vive la Republique.' Later tactics 'At the outset, a heavy bombardment would be loosed against the enemy formations, causing fearful losses if they failed to seek shelter, and generally lowering their power of resistance. Under cover of this fire, swarms of voltigeurs would advance to within musketry range and add a disconcerting ‘nuisance’ element by sniping at officers and the like. This preliminary phase would be followed by a series of heavy cavalry and infantry attacks. The secret of these was careful timing and coordination. The first cavalry charges were designed to defeat the hostile cavalry and compel the enemy infantry to form squares', thereby reduce fire in any one direction and enable the columns to get to close grips before the enemy could resume his linear formation. The infantry (deployed or not) and accompanying horse artillery would then blaze a gap in the enemy formation and finally the cavalry would sweep forward, again, to exploit the breakthrough. Essential point Early tactics, without apparent design, operate in a fluid, adaptable manner to uncover, expand and exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses while later tactics emphasize massed firepower and stereotyped formations working formally together to smash adversary strength. 37


Historical patternNapoleon’s art of war : Historical pattern Napoleon’s art of war Critique Napoleon exploited ambiguity, deception, and mobility at the strategic level, whereas, He increasingly emphasized formal battering ram methods and de-emphasized loose, irregular methods (e.g. skirmishers) at the tactics level—via a return to, and increasingly heavy-handed application of, the 1791 Drill Regulations. Why? Napoleon emphasized the conduct of war from the top down. He created and exploited strategic success to procure grand tactical and tactical success. To support his concept, he set up a highly centralized command and control system which, when coupled with essentially unvarying tactical recipes, resulted in strength smashing into strength by increasingly unimaginative, formalized, and predictable actions at lower and lower levels. Result Strategic maneuvers ambiguous and deceiving prior to tactical concentration; after concentration, 'maneuvers' stereotyped and obvious. hence Tactical 'maneuvers' could not easily procure the victory because of their obvious, predictable nature. 38


Which unveils : Which unveils The Napoleonic spirit Strategic 'fog' followed by stereotyped and ruinous tactical assaults. 39


Historical patternCarl von Clausewitz On War 1832 : Historical pattern Carl von Clausewitz On War 1832 Character/nature of war An act of policy to use violence to impose one’s will upon another Duel or act of human interaction directed against an animate object that reacts Uncertainty of information acts as an impediment to vigorous activity. Psychological/moral forces and effects (danger, intelligence, emotional factors …) either impede or stimulate activity. Friction (interaction of many factors, including those above) impedes activity. Genius (harmonious balance of mind/temperament that permit one to overcome friction and excel at the complex activity of war) changes the nature and magnifies the scope of operations. Strategy Exhaust enemy by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort. Seek out those centers of gravity upon which all power/movement depend and, if possible, trace them back to a single one. Compress all effort, against those centers, into the fewest possible actions Subordinate all minor, or secondary, actions as much as possible. Move with the utmost speed. Seek the major battle (with superiority of number and conditions that will promise a decisive victory). Aim 'Render enemy powerless'—with emphasis on 'the destruction of his armed forces' 40


Historical patternCarl von Clausewitz On War 1832 : Historical pattern Carl von Clausewitz On War 1832 Critique Clausewitz overemphasized decisive battle and underemphasized strategic maneuver. Clausewitz emphasized method and routine at the tactical level. Why? Clausewitz was concerned with trying to overcome, or reduce, friction/uncertainty. He failed to address the idea of magnifying adversary’s friction/uncertainty. Clausewitz was concerned with trying to exhaust adversary by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort. He failed to address, or develop, the idea of trying to paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity of expend effort. Clausewitz incorrectly stated: 'A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely'—then argued that this is the place where the blows must be aimed and where the decision should be reached. He failed to develop idea of generating many non-cooperative centers of gravity by striking at those vulnerable, yet critical, tendons, connections, and activities that permit a larger system to exist. ? Raises question ? What does all this mean? 41


Historical patternCarl von Clausewitz On War 1832 : Historical pattern Carl von Clausewitz On War 1832 42 Message Clausewitz did not see that many non-cooperative, or conflicting, centers of gravity paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directed fashion, hence they impede vigorous activity and magnify friction. Likely result Operations end in a 'bloodbath'—via the well regulated stereotyped tactics and unimaginative battles of attrition suggested by Clausewitz.


Historical patternJomini 1861 : Historical pattern Jomini 1861 Secret of success '… the narratives of Frederick the Great: commenced to initiate me in the secret which had caused him to gain the miraculous victory of Leuthen. I perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple maneuver of carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the hostile army … I found again, afterwards, the same cause in the first successes of Napoleon in Italy, which gave me the idea that by applying, through strategy, to the whole chess-table of a war this same principle which Frederick had applied to battles, we should have the key to all the science of war.' 43


Historical patternJomini The Art of War 1836 : Historical pattern Jomini The Art of War 1836 Key idea and supporting mechanism Generalize oblique order associated with Battles at Leuctra and Leuthen Divide theater and its subordinate components (zones, fronts, positions, etc.) into three-subdivisions—a center and two wings—as basis to apply the Leuctra/Leuthen concept in strategic and grand tactical maneuvers. Set-up base(s) of operations and (alternative) lines of communication for freedom to shape and shift flow/direction of operations as basis to apply Leuctra/Leuthen strategic and grand tactical maneuvers. Strategy/grand tactics By free and rapid movements carry bulk of the forces (successively) against fractions of the enemy. Strike in the most decisive direction—that is to say against the center or one wing or the center and one wing simultaneously. If possible, seize adversary’s communications (without losing one’s own) and force him to fight on a reverse front, by using bulk of forces to hit his flank and take him in the rear—while using detachments, as needed, to block the arrival of reinforcements as well as draw his attention elsewhere. If the enemy’s forces are too much extended, pierce his center to divide and crush his fractions separately. To outflank and turn (envelop) a wing, hit enemy in the flank and also contain him at the front. An attack may be made simultaneously upon both extremities but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior (numerically) to the enemy. Aim To make evident a 'secret' for success in war 44


Historical patternJomini The Art of War 1836 : Historical pattern Jomini The Art of War 1836 Critique Preoccupation with form of operations, spatial arrangement of bases, formal orders of battle, and tactical formations. Lack of appreciation for the use of loose, irregular swarms of guerrillas and skirmishers to mask own dispositions, activities, and intentions as well as confuse and disorder enemy operations. Likely result Operations become stereotyped—unless one can appreciate Jomini’s ideas outside their formal underpinnings. 45


Historical patternNapoleon, Clausewitz, Jomini : Historical pattern Napoleon, Clausewitz, Jomini Key point Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini did not appreciate importance of loose, irregular tactical arrangements and activities to mask or distort own presence and intentions as well as confuse and disorder adversary operations. ? Why ? Major flaw Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini viewed the conduct of war and related operations in essentially one direction—from the top down—emphasizing adaptability at the top and regularity at the bottom. 46


Emil Schalk Summary of The Art of War 1862 : Emil Schalk Summary of The Art of War 1862 'There are three great maxims common to the whole science of war; they are: 1st—Concentrate your force, and act with the whole of it on one part only of the enemy’s force. 2nd—Act against the weakest part of your enemy—his center, if he is dispersed; his flank or rear, if concentrated. Act against his communications without endangering your own. 3rd—Whatever you do, as soon as you have made your plan, and taken the decision to act upon it, act with the utmost speed, so that you may obtain your object before the enemy suspects what you are about.' Caution While these maxims by Schalk portray, in a general way, physical maneuvers that can be used to realize one’s purpose in war at the strategic level, they do not address the non-adaptability and predictability (via the drill regulation mind-set) that permeated 19th century 'maneuvers' at the tactical level. 47


Impact of 19th century technology on war : Impact of 19th century technology on war Key ingredients Railroad/telegraph Quick fire artillery Machine gun Repeating rifle Barbed wire Trenches Early trends Emphasis toward massed firepower and large armies supported by rail logistics Increased emphasis on a holding defense and flanking or wide turning maneuvers into adversary rear to gain a decision Continued use of frontal assaults by large stereotyped infantry formations (e.g. regiments, battalions), supported by artillery barrages, against regions of strong resistance Result Huge armies, and massed firepower and other vast needs supported through a narrow fixed logistics network, together with tactical assaults by large stereotyped formations, suppressed ambiguity, deception, and mobility hence surprise of any operation. 48


Technology and the art of war : Technology and the art of war The legacy of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini’s tactical regularity and the continued use of large stereotyped formations for tactical assault, together with the mobilization of large armies and massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network, 'telegraphed' any punch hence minimized the possibility of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and mobility to generate surprise for a decisive edge. In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and debilitating casualties on all sides during the: American Civil War (1861-65) Austro-Prussian War (1866) Franco-Prussian War (1870) Boer War (1899-1902) Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) World War I (1914-18) Point Evolution of tactics did not keep pace with increased weapons lethality developed and produced by 19th century technology. ? Raises question ? Why were the 19th century and early 20th century commanders unable to evolve better tactics to avoid over a half century of debilitating casualties? 49


Impact of 19th century capitalism on insurrection/revolution(with a Marxian flavor) : Impact of 19th century capitalism on insurrection/revolution (with a Marxian flavor) Comment A look back reveals that we have been speaking of conflict between social systems, rather than within social systems. With the explosive expansion of capitalism in the 19th century we begin to see the rise of much turmoil and attendant conflict due to opposing tendencies contained within capitalism itself. Trend Without going into explicit detail we find (according to many investigators, including Karl Marx): that the interaction of competition, technology, specialization (division of labor), concentration of production in large scale enterprises, and the taking and plowing back of profits into this interaction produce opposing tendencies and periodic crises that leave in their wake more and more workers competing for jobs in fewer and fewer, but larger, firms that increasingly emphasize (percentage-wise) the use of more machines and less labor. Result Low paid wage earners exhibit discontent and hatred for a system that permits others to live in comfort or luxury while they must live a life of toil, subject to strict and frequently harsh factory discipline. Witnessing these unfolding circumstances disillusioned intellectuals, bankrupt owners, and others take the side of the workers, as an enlightened vanguard, to mold them into a powerful opposition. Raises question How should such an unpleasant situation be corrected? 50


Impact of 19th century capitalism on insurrection/revolution(with a Marxian flavor) : Message According to Marx/Engels and their followers, the only way out is via revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat (workers) to smash the capitalistic system and replace it with one that does not exploit and oppress masses for the benefit of a ruling elite or class. Necessary conditions for success Crisis generated by discontent/misery of masses and vacillation by authorities who indicate unwillingness or inability to come to grips with existing instability. Vanguard, or disciplined hard core, that offers leadership, provides a way out, and has support of masses. Why Crises represent height of confusion/disorder due to many opposing tendencies (centers of gravity) that magnify friction, hence paralyze efforts by authorities to dominate such surges of turmoil. In this sense, crises are periods of vulnerability/weakness that beg to be exploited. Vanguards represent disciplined moral/mental/physical bodies focused to shape and guide masses as well as participate in action to exploit and expand confusion/disorder of crises that shake adversary’s will to respond in a directed way. Key insight Crises and Vanguards are the golden keys that permit us to penetrate to the core of insurrection/revolution and, as we shall see later, modern guerrilla warfare. 51 Impact of 19th century capitalism on insurrection/revolution (with a Marxian flavor)


Capitalism, technology and the conduct of war : Capitalism, technology and the conduct of war The creation of crises and vanguards, via 19th century capitalism, make evident the foundations upon which to conduct insurrection/revolution in order to destroy a society from within. On the other hand It is not yet clear how these notions change or fit into the way we exploit technology and conduct war against societies from within as well as from without. To gain such an appreciation we must look at the period containing World War I, World War II, and their aftermath. 52


World War I : World War I Plans and execution Stagnation Finale 53


Schlieffen strategic maneuver : Schlieffen strategic maneuver August 4 – September 8, 1914 54


World War I : World War I Action Offensives conducted on wide frontages—emphasizing few, rather than many, harmonious yet independent thrusts. Evenness of advance maintained to protect flanks and provide artillery support as advance makes headway. Reserves thrown in whenever attack held-up—against regions or points of strong resistance. Reaction Defense organized into depth of successive belts of fortified terrain. Massed artillery and machine-gun fire designed to arrest and pin down attacker. Counter-attack to win back lost ground. Result Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected along paths of hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed firepower and infantry. 55


World War Ia way out : World War I a way out Infiltration tactics Guerrilla tactics Capt. Andre Laffargue Gen. von Hutier? Gen. Ludendorff T.E. Lawrence Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck 56 Idea Authors


World War Iinfiltration tactics : World War I infiltration tactics Action Brief but intense artillery bombardment, that includes gas and smoke shell, to disrupt/suppress defenses and obscure the assault. Stosstruppen (small teams or squads of thrust troops equipped with light machine-guns, flame-throwers, etc.) thrust forward close behind rolling artillery barrage, without any 'effort to maintain a uniform rate of advance or align formations'. Instead, as many tiny, irregular swarms spaced in breadth and echeloned in depth, they seep or flow into any gaps or weaknesses they can find in order to drive deep into adversary rear. Kampfgruppen (small battle groups consisting of infantry, machine-gunners, mortar teams, artillery observers and field engineers) follow-up to cave-in exposed flanks and mop-up isolated centers of resistance from flank and rear. Reserves and stronger follow-on echelons move through newly created breaches to maintain momentum and exploit success, as well as attack flanks and rear to widen penetration and consolidate gains against counter attack. Idea Hurl strength (echeloned in great depth), via an irruption of many thrusts, thru weaknesses along (many) paths of least resistance to gain the opportunity for breakthrough and envelopment. 57


World War Iinfiltration tactics : World War I infiltration tactics Note Such classic descriptions, often repeated, create in listeners or readers minds vivid images of the infiltration technique. Critique Unfortunately this depiction does not address how and why infiltration fire and movement schemes work. 58


World War Iinfiltration tactics : World War I infiltration tactics Key points Fire at all levels by artillery, mortars, and machine-guns is exploited to hold adversary attention and pin him down hence— Fire together with gas and smoke (as well as fog and mist) represent an immediate and ominous threat to capture adversary attention, force heads down and dramatically obscure view, thereby cloak infiltrators movements. Dispersed and irregular character of moving swarms (as opposed to well defined line abreast formations) permit infiltrators to blend against irregular and changing terrain features as they push forward. Taken together, the captured attention, the obscured view, and the indistinct character of moving dispersed/irregular swarms deny adversary the opportunity to picture what is taking place. Result Infiltration teams appear to suddenly loom-up out of nowhere to blow thru, around, and behind disoriented defenders. 59


World War Iinfiltration tactics : World War I infiltration tactics Essence Cloud/distort signature and improve mobility to avoid fire yet focus effort to penetrate, shatter, envelop, and mop-up disconnected or isolated debris of adversary system. Intent Exploit tactical dispersion in a focused way to gain tactical success and expand it into a grand tactical success. Implication Small units exploiting tactical dispersion in a focused way—rather than large formations abiding by the 'Principle of Concentration'—penetrate adversary to generate many non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity as basis to magnify friction, paralyze effort, and bring about adversary collapse. 60


? Natural question ? : ? Natural question ? Are infiltration tactics a rejection of the Napoleonic methods—or are they application of these methods under a different guise? 61


Slide63 : Response Infiltration fire and movement schemes can be viewed as Napoleon’s multi-thrust strategic penetration maneuvers being transformed into multi-thrust tactical penetration maneuvers down to the lowest operational/organizational level—the squad. Point Until the rise of the infiltration tactics (and the use of tanks by the allies) in the latter part of WWI, neither the 19th century nor the 20th century commanders were able to evolve effective tactical penetration maneuvers that could offset the massive increase in weapons lethality developed during this same period. Why The aristocratic tradition, the top-down command and control system, the slavish addiction to the 'Principle of Concentration', and the drill regulation mind-set, all taken together, reveal an 'obsession for control' by high-level superiors over low-level subordinates that restrict any imagination, initiative, and adaptability needed by a system to evolve the indistinct-irregular-mobile tactics that could counter the increase in weapons lethality. 62


World War Iinfiltration tactics : World War I infiltration tactics Result Immediate success at platoon/company/battalion level coupled with ultimate failure at corps/army level. Why Ludendorff violated his own concept by his tendency to use strategic reserves to reinforce against hardened resistance—hence, at the strategic level, he seduced himself into supporting failure not success. Exhaustion of combat teams leading the assault. Logistics too inflexible to support rapid/fluid penetration and deeper exploitation of breakthrough. Communications too immobile to allow command to quickly identify and reinforce successful advances. Elastic zone defense, when used, (as developed by the Germans and practiced by Pétain) that emphasizes artillery and flank attacks against penetrations when they stretch beyond their own artillery support. 63


World War I Guerrilla Warfare(a la T.E. Lawrence) : World War I Guerrilla Warfare (a la T.E. Lawrence) Action Gain support of population. Must 'arrange the minds' of friend, foe and neutral alike. Must 'get inside their minds'. Must 'be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas' (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of action). Must be an 'attack-in-depth'. Tactics 'should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes' with 'use of the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place'. Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a threat everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and environmental background (vast unknown desert) as basis for 'never affording a target' and 'never on the defensive except by accident and in error'. Idea Disintegrate existing regime’s ability to govern. 64


Impression : Impression Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff seem to be similar in nature to irregular or guerrilla tactics a la Lawrence. Why? Both stress clouded/distorted signatures, mobility and cohesion of small units as basis to insert an amorphous yet focused effort into or thru adversary weaknesses. 65


Major advances between World War I and II : Major advances between World War I and II Soviet revolutionary strategy Lenin, and after him Stalin, exploited the idea of crises and vanguards—that arise out of Marxian contradictions within capitalism—to lay-out Soviet revolutionary strategy. Result: A scheme that emphasizes moral/psychological factors as basis to destroy a regime from within. Lightning war (Blitzkrieg) Infiltration tactics of 1918 were mated with: Tank Motorized Artillery Tactical Aircraft Motor Transport Better Communications Result: Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region with multiple narrow thrusts using armor, motorized infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft. Guerrilla war Mao Tse-Tung synthesized Sun Tzu’s ideas, classic guerrilla strategy and tactics, and Napoleonic style mobile operations under an umbrella of Soviet revolutionary ideas to create a powerful way for waging modern (guerrilla) war. Result: Modern guerrilla warfare has become an overall political, economic, social and military framework for 'total war'. by J.F.C. Fuller Heinz Guderian 66


Soviet revolutionary strategy (a la Lenin/Stalin) : Soviet revolutionary strategy (a la Lenin/Stalin) Tasks Employ agitation and propaganda in order to exploit opposing tendencies, internal tensions, etc. Object is to bring about a crises, to make revolution ripe as well as convince masses that there is a way-out. This is accomplished when the vanguard is able to: Fan discontent/misery of working class and masses and focus it as hatred toward existing system. Cause vacillation/indecision among authorities so that they cannot come to grips with existing instability. 'Confuse other elements in society so that they don’t know exactly what is happening or where the movement is going.' Convince 'proletariat class they have a function—the function of promoting revolution in order to secure the promised ideal society.' Concentrate 'the main forces of the revolution at the enemy’s most vulnerable spot at the decisive moment, when the revolution has already become ripe, when the offensive is going full steam ahead, when insurrection is knocking at the door, and when bringing the reserves up to the vanguard is the decisive condition of success.' To quote Lenin on paraphrasing Marx and Engels: 'Never play with insurrection, but, when beginning it, firmly realize that you must go to the end.' 'Concentrate a great superiority of forces at the decisive point, at the decisive moment, otherwise the enemy, who has the advantage of better preparation and organization, will destroy the insurgents.' 'Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest determination, and by all means, without fail, take the offensive. The defensive is the death of an armed rising.’' 'You must try to take the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when his forces are scattered.' 'You must strive for daily successes, even if small (one might say hourly, if it is the case of one town), and at all costs retain the ‘moral ascendancy.' 67


Soviet revolutionary strategy (a la Lenin/Stalin) : Soviet revolutionary strategy (a la Lenin/Stalin) Tasks Select 'the moment for the decisive blow, the moment for starting the insurrection, so timed as to coincide with the moment when the crisis has reached its climax, when the vanguard is prepared to fight to the end, the reserves are prepared to support the vanguard, and maximum consternation reigns in the ranks of the enemy.' According to Lenin the decisive moment has arrived when: 'All the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength;' 'All the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elements—the petty bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois democrats as distinct from the bourgeoisie—have sufficiently exposed themselves in the eyes of the people, have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy;' 'Among the proletariat a mass sentiment in favor of supporting the most determined, supremely bold, revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has arisen and has. begun to grow vigorously. Then revolution is indeed ripe. Then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated above … and if we have chosen the moment rightly, our victory is assured.' Pursue 'the course adopted, no matter what difficulties and complications are encountered on the road towards the goal. This is necessary in order that the vanguard not lose sight of the main goal of the struggle and the masses not stray from the road while marching towards that goal and striving to rally around the vanguard.' Maneuver 'the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong … when, with the given relation of forces, retreat becomes the only way to escape a blow against the vanguard and retain the vanguard’s reserves. The object of this strategy is to gain time, to disrupt the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive.' Goal Destroy capitalism as well as its offspring imperialism and replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat. 68


Blitzkrieg and guerrilla strategy : Blitzkrieg and guerrilla strategy Infiltration and isolation Blitz and guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the moral fiber of the political, economic and social structure. Simultaneously, via diplomatic, psychological, and various sub-rosa or other activities, they strip-away potential allies thereby isolate intended victim(s) for forthcoming blows. To carry out this program, a la Sun Tzu, blitz, and guerrillas: Probe and test adversary, and any allies that may rally to his side, in order to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions. Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc., in order to foment mistrust, sow discord and shape both adversary’s and allies’ perception of the world thereby: Create atmosphere of 'mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness, panic' … Manipulate or undermine adversary’s plans and actions. Make it difficult, if not impossible, for allies to aid adversary during his time of trial. Purpose Force capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and military pressures or Weaken foe to minimize his resistance against military blows that will follow. 69


Blitzkrieg : Blitzkrieg Action Intelligence (signal, photo, agent … ), reconnaissance (air and ground), and patrol actions probe and test adversary before and during combat operations to uncover as well as shape changing patterns of strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions. Adversary patterns, and associated changes, are weighed against friendly situation to expose attractive, or appropriate, alternatives that exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence help shape mission commitment and influence command intent. Mission assigned. Schwerpunkt (focus of main effort) established before and shifted during combat operations to bypass adversary strength and strike at weakness. Nebenpunkte (other related or supporting efforts) employed to tie-up, focus, or drain-away adversary attention and strength (elsewhere). Special seizure/disruption teams infiltrate (by air or other means) enemy rear areas where, with agents already in place, they: seize bridges and road crossings, sever communications, incapacitate or blow-up power stations, seize or blow-up fuel dumps, … as well as sow confusion/disorder via 'false messages and fake orders'. Indirect and direct air firepower efforts together with (any needed) sudden/brief preliminary artillery fires are focused in appropriate areas to impede (or channel) adversary movement, disrupt communications, suppress forward defensive fires, obscure the advance, and divert attention. Armored reconnaissance or stormtrooper teams, leading armored columns, advance rapidly from least expected regions and infiltrate adversary front to find paths of least resistance. Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, anti-tank guns, and combat engineers as well as other specialists, together with close artillery and air support, quickly open breaches (via frontal/flank fire and movement combinations) into adversary rear along paths of least resistance uncovered by armored reconnaissance or stormtroopers. When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams led by armored recce with air support (recce, fire, and airlift when necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into adversary interior. Object is to cut lines of communication, disrupt movement, paralyze command and envelop adversary forces and resources. Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor pour-in to collapse isolated pockets of resistance, widen the breaches and secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible counter-attack. Idea Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by gaining initial surprise and exploiting the fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams, with air support, as basis to repeatedly penetrate, splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out disconnected remnants of adversary organism in order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or capacity to resist. 70


Slide72 : Impression Reflection upon discussion, so far, reveals that Blitzkrieg generates many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as undermines or seizes those that adversary depends upon, in order to impede vigorous activity and magnify friction, thereby paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directed way. ? Raises nagging question ? How do blitzers simultaneously sustain rapid pace and abruptly adapt to changing circumstances without losing cohesion or coherency of their overall effort? 71


Blitz operating philosophy : Blitz operating philosophy Key point Each level from simple to complex (platoon to theater) has their own observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle that increases as we try to control more levels and details of command at the higher levels. Put simply, as the number of events we must consider increase, the longer it takes to observe-orient-decide-act. Idea This brings out the idea that faster tempo, or rhythm, at lower levels should work within the slower rhythm but larger pattern at higher levels so that overall system does not lose its cohesion or coherency. Raises question How do blitzers harmonize these differing tempos/rhythms so that they can exploit the faster rhythm/smaller pattern (of the lower-level units) yet maintain the coherency of the rhythm/pattern for the larger effort? Response Give lower-level commanders wide freedom, within an overall mind-time-space scheme, to shape/direct their own activities so that they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at tactical levels yet be in harmony with the larger pattern/slower rhythm associated with the more general aim and larger effort at the strategic level. Shaping agents Shape overall scheme by using mission concept or sense of mission to fix responsibility and shape commitment at all levels and through all parts of the organism. Likewise, use Schwerpunkt concept through all levels to link differing rhythms/patterns so that each part or level of the organic whole can operate at its own natural rhythm—without pulling organism apart—instead of the slower pace associated with a rigid centralized control. 72


? Raises questions ? : ? Raises questions ? What does an overall mind-time-space scheme imply or presuppose? How do mission and Schwerpunkt concepts give shape to this overall scheme? 73


Overall mind-time-space scheme : Overall mind-time-space scheme Message According to General Gunther Blumentritt, such a scheme presupposes a common outlook based upon 'a body of professional officers who have received exactly the same training during the long years of peace and with the same tactical education, the same way of thinking, identical speech, hence a body of officers to whom all tactical conceptions were fully clear.' Furthermore, a la General Blumentritt, it presupposes 'an officers training institution which allows the subordinate a very great measure of freedom of action and freedom in the manner of executing orders and which primarily calls for independent daring, initiative and sense of responsibility.' Point Without a common outlook superiors cannot give subordinates freedom-of-action and maintain coherency of ongoing action. Implication A common outlook possessed by 'a body of officers' represents a unifying theme that can be used to simultaneously encourage subordinate initiative yet realize superior intent. 74


? Raises question ? : ? Raises question ? Very nice, but how do the German concepts of mission and Schwerpunkt give shape to this scheme? 75


Mission : Mission Message The German concept of mission can be thought of as a contract, hence an agreement, between superior and subordinate. The subordinate agrees to make his actions serve his superior’s intent in terms of what is to be accomplished, while the superior agrees to give his subordinate wide freedom to exercise his imagination and initiative in terms of how intent is to be realized. As part of this concept, the subordinate is given the right to challenge or question the feasibility of mission if he feels his superior’s ideas on what can be achieved are not in accord with the existing situation or if he feels his superior has not given him adequate resources to carry it out. Likewise, the superior has every right to expect his subordinate to carry-out the mission contract when agreement is reached on what can be achieved consistent with the existing situation and resources provided. Limitation While this concept of mission gives form and expression to what is expected between an individual superior and subordinate, it does not suggest ways to coordinate or harmonize activities among many superiors and subordinates as a collective group. 76


? Raises question ? : ? Raises question ? With this limitation in mind how does Schwerpunkt play into or add to this concept? 77


Schwerpunkt(focus of main effort)