logging in or signing up Benincasa MO411 Aric85 Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 28 Category: Entertainment License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: October 15, 2007 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript FPIAA - Find Persons Inside Atlas AreasA system for finding and rescuing persons in a very large physics experiment: FPIAA - Find Persons Inside Atlas Areas A system for finding and rescuing persons in a very large physics experiment Gianpaolo Benincasa, CERN-Geneva-Switzerland Carlos Cardeira, David Claudino, IDMEC/IST, Portugal Amelia Maio, LIP-Lisbon-Portugal, CFNUL and FCUL THE ATLAS DETECTOR: THE ATLAS DETECTORRisks existing in the ATLAS cavern: The detection principles used in ATLAS produce several kinds of risks for persons. Amongst others we recall : the large quantities of cryogenic fluids( liquid Argon, liquid Nitrogen and liquid Helium), suffocating and explosive gases( Muon chambers..) fire( large electric power..), high voltages, thousands of Laser beams for alignment and calibration, ionizing radiations ( activation..), magnetic fields (2 T) etc.. Despite the meticulous care that has been put in the design and implementation of the alarms and safety systems, a mishap is always possible and a particular attention must then be devoted to the rapidity of intervention. Risks existing in the ATLAS cavernWhere persons could be: Unlike other big Experiments, it will be possible and necessary to penetrate inside ATLAS hidden regions. Hidden paths inside these regions can be several tens of meters long. In case of urgency if the number of exiting people does not match with the number of present persons, it would be extremely difficult and dangerously long for the rescue team to find a person in this maze. It is then essential to know at each moment where the persons are, especially inside ATLAS and in the most dangerous regions in the cavern. This information will be provided by the FPIAA system A minimum requirement for the FPIAA is the coverage of the following zones: the regions inside ATLAS accessible by persons the two regions at the extremities of the cavern the floor of the cavern the gangways on the lateral walls of the cavern Where persons could beAccessible regions inside ATLAS: Accessible regions inside ATLASStructures around ATLAS: Structures around ATLASConstraints and precision of a FPIAA system: A) Sensitivity: detect a person in a cell of approx. 30m3 B) Metallic environment: The system will work in an environment which will highly absorb electromagnetic waves: no long distance transmission/reception can be used. C) Electromagnetic fields: No intense microwaves sources can be used. D) Magnetic field: Must work inside a very intense M field(2 T). E) Radiation field: Must work under an ionization field (neutrons and gamma). F) User friendliness: No special device worn by the user. CONSEQUENCES Only the Ultrasonic (US) or Passive Infrared (PIR) devices could fulfill all together these requirements. Identification by name is abandoned. Constraints and precision of a FPIAA systemSelection of an appropriate detector: The commercial PIR and US detectors, usually do not comply with the severe constraints existing in the ATLAS environment: The intense ionizing radiation field (integrated on 20 years) 1.4 1012 n/cm2 of high energy neutrons (above 1 MeV) 60 Gy of gamma dose Magnetic field that reaches a value of 2 T in certain regions Sequence of modifications on commercial detectors Both the US and PIR passed the irradiation tests However magnetic tests failed (relay) Relay changed with a solid state relay Magnetic tests passed, but irradiation test failed (solid state relay) Solid state relay replaced by a optocoupler (existing in the ELMB) Both magnetic and irradiation tests passed with a safety factor of 5 (for irradiations) Final choice Modified, non expensive commercial PIR (overall better behavior than US) Selection of an appropriate detectorGeographical distribution of the PIR detectors: The FPIAA system does not cover the totality of the cavern: it covers only the most dangerous regions .However it is easily expandable. The protected regions are: 2 regions for the structures on the long walls (~120 PIR) 2 regions for the structures on the short walls (~80 PIR) 1 region for the floor of the cavern (~20 PIR) 1 region for the ATLAS detector itself (~160 PIR) The problem of the “Dead man” Every region is composed by a certain number of adjacent cells and has a layer of boundary cells, separating it from the non-protected regions. If a person disappears from a cell, without re-appearing in an adjacent cell during a given time window (time out), an alarm is issued. Only if this situation happens in one of the boundary cells, one considers that the person has left the protected region Geographical distribution of the PIR detectorsHARDWARE LAYOUT: PIR and US (if used) detect the movement ELMB– The Embedded Local Monitor Board (ELMB) is a CERN standard, general-purpose plug-on I/O module CANBus– The Controller Area Network is a high-integrity capable, serial communications bus for real-time control applications PC0 contains the software to drive CANbus and communicate with network PC1 runs the actual FPIAA application Wireless cameras and webcams can be added if required HARDWARE LAYOUTSoftware Modules: Software ModulesControl Module: Control ModuleFPIAA PROTOTYPE DEMONormal situation: FPIAA PROTOTYPE DEMO Normal situationFPIAA PROTOTYPE DEMOAlarm situation: FPIAA PROTOTYPE DEMO Alarm situationConclusions and further work: To achieve FPIAA goals, several challenges were overcome: The user friendliness of the system which does not force the users to use any special device. The need to make the sensors work in such hostile environments plenty of radiations and under strong magnetic fields. The software made for handling the sensors and the state of the different cells was the solution we found to avoid false alarms when a person is not moving. Further work for this project includes: The positioning of the sensors to cover all the protected areas. The adaptation of the prototype software to the CERN existing Data Control System. The installation of a pilot site for exhaustive tests with the sensors, persons and the FPIAA system. Conclusions and further work You do not have the permission to view this presentation. In order to view it, please contact the author of the presentation.
Benincasa MO411 Aric85 Download Post to : URL : Related Presentations : Share Add to Flag Embed Email Send to Blogs and Networks Add to Channel Uploaded from authorPOINTLite Insert YouTube videos in PowerPont slides with aS Desktop Copy embed code: (To copy code, click on the text box) Embed: URL: Thumbnail: WordPress Embed Customize Embed The presentation is successfully added In Your Favorites. Views: 28 Category: Entertainment License: All Rights Reserved Like it (0) Dislike it (0) Added: October 15, 2007 This Presentation is Public Favorites: 0 Presentation Description No description available. Comments Posting comment... Premium member Presentation Transcript FPIAA - Find Persons Inside Atlas AreasA system for finding and rescuing persons in a very large physics experiment: FPIAA - Find Persons Inside Atlas Areas A system for finding and rescuing persons in a very large physics experiment Gianpaolo Benincasa, CERN-Geneva-Switzerland Carlos Cardeira, David Claudino, IDMEC/IST, Portugal Amelia Maio, LIP-Lisbon-Portugal, CFNUL and FCUL THE ATLAS DETECTOR: THE ATLAS DETECTORRisks existing in the ATLAS cavern: The detection principles used in ATLAS produce several kinds of risks for persons. Amongst others we recall : the large quantities of cryogenic fluids( liquid Argon, liquid Nitrogen and liquid Helium), suffocating and explosive gases( Muon chambers..) fire( large electric power..), high voltages, thousands of Laser beams for alignment and calibration, ionizing radiations ( activation..), magnetic fields (2 T) etc.. Despite the meticulous care that has been put in the design and implementation of the alarms and safety systems, a mishap is always possible and a particular attention must then be devoted to the rapidity of intervention. Risks existing in the ATLAS cavernWhere persons could be: Unlike other big Experiments, it will be possible and necessary to penetrate inside ATLAS hidden regions. Hidden paths inside these regions can be several tens of meters long. In case of urgency if the number of exiting people does not match with the number of present persons, it would be extremely difficult and dangerously long for the rescue team to find a person in this maze. It is then essential to know at each moment where the persons are, especially inside ATLAS and in the most dangerous regions in the cavern. This information will be provided by the FPIAA system A minimum requirement for the FPIAA is the coverage of the following zones: the regions inside ATLAS accessible by persons the two regions at the extremities of the cavern the floor of the cavern the gangways on the lateral walls of the cavern Where persons could beAccessible regions inside ATLAS: Accessible regions inside ATLASStructures around ATLAS: Structures around ATLASConstraints and precision of a FPIAA system: A) Sensitivity: detect a person in a cell of approx. 30m3 B) Metallic environment: The system will work in an environment which will highly absorb electromagnetic waves: no long distance transmission/reception can be used. C) Electromagnetic fields: No intense microwaves sources can be used. D) Magnetic field: Must work inside a very intense M field(2 T). E) Radiation field: Must work under an ionization field (neutrons and gamma). F) User friendliness: No special device worn by the user. CONSEQUENCES Only the Ultrasonic (US) or Passive Infrared (PIR) devices could fulfill all together these requirements. Identification by name is abandoned. Constraints and precision of a FPIAA systemSelection of an appropriate detector: The commercial PIR and US detectors, usually do not comply with the severe constraints existing in the ATLAS environment: The intense ionizing radiation field (integrated on 20 years) 1.4 1012 n/cm2 of high energy neutrons (above 1 MeV) 60 Gy of gamma dose Magnetic field that reaches a value of 2 T in certain regions Sequence of modifications on commercial detectors Both the US and PIR passed the irradiation tests However magnetic tests failed (relay) Relay changed with a solid state relay Magnetic tests passed, but irradiation test failed (solid state relay) Solid state relay replaced by a optocoupler (existing in the ELMB) Both magnetic and irradiation tests passed with a safety factor of 5 (for irradiations) Final choice Modified, non expensive commercial PIR (overall better behavior than US) Selection of an appropriate detectorGeographical distribution of the PIR detectors: The FPIAA system does not cover the totality of the cavern: it covers only the most dangerous regions .However it is easily expandable. The protected regions are: 2 regions for the structures on the long walls (~120 PIR) 2 regions for the structures on the short walls (~80 PIR) 1 region for the floor of the cavern (~20 PIR) 1 region for the ATLAS detector itself (~160 PIR) The problem of the “Dead man” Every region is composed by a certain number of adjacent cells and has a layer of boundary cells, separating it from the non-protected regions. If a person disappears from a cell, without re-appearing in an adjacent cell during a given time window (time out), an alarm is issued. Only if this situation happens in one of the boundary cells, one considers that the person has left the protected region Geographical distribution of the PIR detectorsHARDWARE LAYOUT: PIR and US (if used) detect the movement ELMB– The Embedded Local Monitor Board (ELMB) is a CERN standard, general-purpose plug-on I/O module CANBus– The Controller Area Network is a high-integrity capable, serial communications bus for real-time control applications PC0 contains the software to drive CANbus and communicate with network PC1 runs the actual FPIAA application Wireless cameras and webcams can be added if required HARDWARE LAYOUTSoftware Modules: Software ModulesControl Module: Control ModuleFPIAA PROTOTYPE DEMONormal situation: FPIAA PROTOTYPE DEMO Normal situationFPIAA PROTOTYPE DEMOAlarm situation: FPIAA PROTOTYPE DEMO Alarm situationConclusions and further work: To achieve FPIAA goals, several challenges were overcome: The user friendliness of the system which does not force the users to use any special device. The need to make the sensors work in such hostile environments plenty of radiations and under strong magnetic fields. The software made for handling the sensors and the state of the different cells was the solution we found to avoid false alarms when a person is not moving. Further work for this project includes: The positioning of the sensors to cover all the protected areas. The adaptation of the prototype software to the CERN existing Data Control System. The installation of a pilot site for exhaustive tests with the sensors, persons and the FPIAA system. Conclusions and further work