FMCT Presentation for Mphil

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FMCT Fissile Materiel Cut-Off Treaty Treaty on the Cessation of Production of Fissile Material for Use in Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Scheme of Presentation : 

Introduction Chronology of important events Definitions ( What is fissile Materiel) Scope of the the treaty Articles Summery ( Text Analyzed) Current Status of the treaty ( Stances of Nation States: South Asia, Far East, Europe n America, Middle East) Linkages to other issues Limitations & Debates on the treaty Recommendations Acknowledgements Scheme of Presentation

Introduction : 

Introduction In the post cold war era there was a dire need of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons to compelling nuclear arms races and to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. Negotiation of such a treaty was endorsed without a dissenting vote in 1993 by the United Nations General Assembly. (UN General Assembly Resolution 48/75L) The Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in 2000 agreed that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” should commence immediately in the multilateral Conference on Disarmament (CD final doc article VI) in Geneva, "with a view to their conclusion within five years.” Nevertheless, the CD has, for various reasons, not yet formally launched negotiations on such a treaty. The purpose of this treaty is to ban the Fissile Material production and eventual elimination of fissile material stockpiles.

Introduction(2) : 

In the discussion of the proposed treaty at the CD, two issues have been especially contentious: verification Declaration of non-production (no verification) 2. Instrumented verification (remote monitoring, automatic sample taking, satellite surveillance) 3. Verification limited to significant production facilities 4. Random verification (challenge inspection) of further nuclear facilities 5. Full verification of all nuclear facilities pre-existing stocks. The debate over whether the treaty should involve a ban on the use of some pre-existing stocks for weapons has even led to the use of two different names for the proposed treaty: Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty FMCT Fissile Material Treaty. FM(C)T It is sometimes refer to FISSBAN also Introduction(2)

Overview : 

A goal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to halt the race for ever more advanced nuclear weapons by stopping testing. Similarly, a goal of the FMCT has long been to halt the race for increasing numbers of nuclear weapons by banning production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for such weapons. Attempts to ban such production for weapons began with the 1946 Acheson-Lillienthal report and the U.S.-sponsored Baruch plan to prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.1 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposed an FMCT in 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower in 1956, President Lyndon Johnson in 1964, Pierre Trudeau in 1978, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989 and President Bill Clinton in 1993, a year in which the U.N. General Assembly for the first time adopted a resolution by consensus calling for such a treaty. Overview

Chronology : 

In pursuit of the UNGA resolution 48/75L, the CD started discussions for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a Fissile Material Treaty in 1994. CD decided to nominate Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada as a Special Coordinator to consult member states on the scope and the negotiating mandate of the proposed ad hoc committee. Ambassador Shannon submitted his report in March 1995, which was accepted by the CD. This is generally referred to as the Shannon Report/ The Report of the Special Coordinator, and is contained in document CD/1299. Chronology

Shannons Report : 

“The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad hoc Committee on a “ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” “Concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention.” “Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the committee only of the future production of fissile material.” “Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also past production.” “Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile material (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.” Shannons Report

Highlights of FMCT : 

• Scope of verification: …same as IAEA safeguards • Extent of verification: …all facilities, incl. civilian power plants • Resulting cost: …more than hundred millions dollars per year • Declaration of stocks: …a first step towards disarmament • Nuclear disarmament: …a time-table as prerequisite Highlights of FMCT

Recent Developments : 

1998: CD FM( C) T Adhoc committee by Canada reconvene 1999. 2000: Amorim Proposal CD/1624 2002: 5 Ambassador's Proposal ( A5) 2008: Draft Presidential Decision 2008: Six Presidents Innitiative 2009: CD May 2009 Recent Developments

Technicalities : 

The extent and the verification modalities of an FMCT depend very strongly on technical parameters about the nuclear materials, in other words: What is “fissile material for peaceful uses”? Where is the threshold for a FMCT? • Uranium: in terms of contents of the relevant isotope U-235, where should the threshold be: 5 % for use in power plants of 20% for use in research reactors and naval propulsion? • Plutonium: in terms of contents of the relevant isotope Pu-239, is plutonium mixed with highly radioactive waste of weapon relevance? Or separated plutonium that has undergone more than one cycle in a power reactor? Technicalities

Definitions : 

The NPT does not provide any specific definition of fissile material. Paragraph one of Article 3 refers to safeguards on all “source or fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility.” (which is not covered by safeguards can and may be used for nuclear weapons and should be covered by the FMT). The US draft treaty contains the following definition of fissile material in Article II: Plutonium, except Plutonium whose isotopic composition includes 80% or greater Plutonium-238. Uranium containing a 20% or greater enrichment in the isotopes Uranium- 233 or Uranium-235, separately or in combination; or Any material that contains the material defined in (a) or (b) above. Definitions

Definitions ( Cont…) : 

“Produce Fissile Material” means:  To separate any fissile material from fission products in irradiated nuclear material; To enrich Plutonium-239 in Plutonium by any isotopic separation process; or To enrich Uranium 233 or Uranium-235 to enrichment of 20% or greater in those isotopes separately or in combination, by any isotopic separation process. Definitions ( Cont…)

Text of the Treaty : 

Preamble Article I: Basic Undertakings Article II: Definitions Article III: Verification Article IV: Declarations Article V: The Organization Article VI: Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance Article VII: National Implémentation Measures Article VIII: Settlement of Disputes Article IX: Protocols Article X: Amendments Article XI: Funding Article XII: Duration, Review and Withdrawal Article XIII: Entry into Force Article XIV: Reservations Article XV: Depositary Article XVI: Authentic Texts Text of the Treaty

Scope of the treaty : 

Should the Fissile Material Treaty be an arms control and disarmament measure or merely a measure for non-proliferation? The minimum element of the scope will be the ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As all non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT are already prohibited from producing nuclear material for weapons, and the five NPT nuclear weapon states have already informally stopped production of nuclear materials for weapons, Scope of the treaty

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Some countries, e.g. Japan, are of the view that once the treaty banning future production has entered into force, state parties possessing fissile material production facilities for use in nuclear weapons would have the obligation to convert those facilities to non-nuclear weapon use or to decommission them or to close them down altogether. Any reversion of such facilities to production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would have to be banned.

Scope (cont…) : 

The non-nuclear weapon states, on the other hand, would like the FMCT to also be a disarmament treaty and therefore have taken the position that any Fissile Material Treaty must provide for a transparent rendering of existing stockpiles of fissile material and contain mechanisms for bringing them under international safeguards. Any diversion of existing or future stocks of fissile material for non-nuclear weapons use to use in nuclear weapons would be equivalent to production and would have to be banned as well. Transfer of stocks to any third state for nuclear weapons use would also be banned. Scope (cont…)

Scope ( Cont…) : 

State parties must also assume the obligation not to assist any state in its efforts to produce or acquire fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The verification regime should be designed in accordance with the scope. Scope ( Cont…)

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Stances of States upon the treaty South Asia China USA Other Notable States

South Asian Stance : 

India and Pakistan agreed to participate in FMCT negotiation positively, in the aftermath of Nuclear tests because of US pressure. Pakistan has adopted ‘delaying tactics’ because it want to enhance it stock piles of fissile material to reduce the disparity with India. Furthermore Pakistan want FMCT as a disarmament measure. However, India indicated following benchmarks for the treaty: Treaty must be non-discriminatory. It must have equal obligations and responsibilities for all member states. It must be internationally and effectively verifiable. South Asian Stance

Pakistan’s Perspective : 

CD 27 August 2009 Ambassador Zamir Akram emphasied Permanent Representative of Pakistan to UN •Despite substantive difficulties with the text, Pakistan had joined the consensus on decision CD/1864 in order to enable the Conference to make across-the-board progress on all the four core issues and in return it was Pakistan's expectation that those issues would be addressed in the implementation of the decision. •Pakistan was confronted with "disappointing and alarming" maneuvers even on procedural issues on the part of some delegations. •Pakistan had a right to ask for flexibility from others since it had accepted several of the amendments proposed to it. Pakistan’s Perspective

Cont… : 

Pakistan was also alarmed by arguments that rotation of chairs of all bodies could not be accepted as a principle. There could be no understanding on the time frame for rotation. Similarly, the rules of procedure, which required negotiating the programme of work at the beginning of every year, had been sought to be bypassed, with suggestions that the present programme should be rolled over for next year and perhaps beyond. Pakistan strongly opposes if issues such as fissile materials will be negotiated outside of the conference. Cont…

Chinas’ Stance : 

China did not support the 1993 UN General Assembly resolution that called for an FMCT, and in March 1994, China stated its opposition to the creation of an ad hoc committee to begin negotiations for an FMCT. However, by July 1994 China had shifted its position, calling the proposed FMCT "an important step toward nuclear disarmament. China has reportedly already ceased production of fissile materials for military purposes--it halted uranium enrichment for military purposes in 1987 and plutonium production for military purposes in 1991. China's insistence on linking the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty to the issue of nuclear disarmament and a Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space treaty (PAROS), and the adamant opposition of others (most significantly the US) to this approach have prevented any progress on the FMCT in the UNCD.  China views PAROS as vital to its own security interests in that it would potentially check America's NMD ambitions, and insists on having ideas of  nuclear disarmament given weight as well, as a condition for proceeding with fissban (FMCT) negotiations. Chinas’ Stance

US Stance : 

1. The Proliferation Security Initiative is to be expanded; 2. Security Council resolution requiring all States to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders; 3. Nunn-Lugar legislation for Russia; 4. The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any State that does not already possess fullscale functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants; 5. Only States that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programs; 6. A special committee of the IAEA Board, which will focus intensively on safeguards and verification; 7. No State under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee. US Stance

Other Notable Stances : 

Other Notable Stances

Summing Up… : 

Covering existing stocks in a cutoff treaty could prove highly contentious because: (1) The stockpiles of the five weapon states range from 4 tons to 145 tons and are significantly larger than those of India, Pakistan, and Israel. (2) It is unclear whether a commitment would be mandatory or voluntary. (3) It is unclear whether the parties could agree on equitable cuts. Summing Up…

A Gentleman's Words : 

A Gentleman's Words

Limitations of the treaty & Debates on the issue : 

Negotiations On Scope There are two possibilities: 1:The issue of scope could be resolved before substantive negotiations on other aspects of the treaty. Alternatively, the scope could be agreed upon as the negotiations proceed, as happened during negotiations on the CTBT where verification was negotiated before agreement on the scope of the treaty. 2:The latter approach created a problem since in determining the scope after verification procedures had been agreed upon, and so the loophole of sub-critical testing could not be plugged. As such many believe that it would be appropriate to resolve the issue of the scope of the treaty before the rest of the treaty is negotiated. The verification regime should be designed in accordance with the scope. Limitations of the treaty & Debates on the issue

Debates ( Cont…) : 

Dispute over Agreement & Purpose A number of non-nuclear-weapon states, however, argue that a fissile material treaty (they tend not to use the word "cutoff") should be not just a nonproliferation measure but a disarmament measure as well, limiting existing stockpiles of fissile material in addition to future production.  Pakistan has taken this position as well, given its fears over India's possibly larger stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Some critics of civilian plutonium reprocessing have gone further, and argued that a fissile cutoff should ban all separation of plutonium, not just separation of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. Debates ( Cont…)

Debates ( Cont…) : 

No major governments participating in the talks appear to be taking this view, however.  At the same time, some analysts, seeing the deadlock over scope and purpose, have proposed redefining the cutoff as focusing not just on production, but on a broad spectrum of measures to improve security for nuclear material in the face of potential terrorism, including improved physical protection. NPT and FMCT: Two sides of the same coin • Like Bush, ElBaradei believes that the NPT's allowance for nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS) to develop civilian nuclear programs has been abused and they suggest options to limit this proliferation threat. ElBaradei proposes cooperative measures, a stronger role for the IAEA, and a renewed commitment to both disarmament and non-proliferation by all NPT members. Bush leans toward control and enforcement mechanisms outside the NPT regime, rather than multilateral arms controls measures • On their part, the NNWS believe that the “inalienable rights” of the NPT prevail and that the Nuclear Weapons States have turned up their nose at their own NPT commitments. Debates ( Cont…)

Recommendations & Policy Options for Pakistan : 

Pakistan’s position is that the management and the proportional reduction of existing stocks must also be a part of the Treaty to eliminate asymmetries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various states. It has proposed that the treaty should be named Fissile Material Treaty and not just a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Recommendations & Policy Options for Pakistan

Recommendations ( Cont…) : 

On the issue of existing stockpiles, it is clear that Pakistan has the smallest stockpile of fissile material among all the nuclear weapons states including India. Pakistan has to decide whether it would like to keep its own stockpiles a secret or would be ready to bring them into the open. In other words, it has to decide whether its insistence on bringing the existing stockpiles within the ambit of the Treaty is a tactical ploy which can be given up at an appropriate time with or without a quid pro quo, or whether it is prepared, with the support of some non-nuclear weapon states, to make this a make or break issue for the Treaty. Recommendations ( Cont…)

Recommendations ( Cont…) : 

While the principle that the Treaty should be a disarmament measure and not merely a non-proliferation measure is unexceptional, Pakistan should consider taking the pragmatic course and drop its demand for inclusion of existing stocks in the treaty at an appropriate stage. If Pakistan is prepared to take the pragmatic line it would be better for it not to pursue the strong and categorical position it articulated during the thematic debate on the FMCT. By doing so Pakistan has made its possible retreat from this position somewhat difficult and embarrassing. Recommendations ( Cont…)

BEST OPTION FOR PAKISTAN : 

So Pakistan should focus on the FMCT and withdraw his position from FMT. BEST OPTION FOR PAKISTAN

Acknowledgements : 

Acknowledgements Brig Naeem Salik for his kind support and benevolent guidance. NDU Being our standout Platform Our enlightened and cooperative classmates.